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AIDING AND ABETTING IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
Oona A. Hathaway, Alexandra Francis, Aaron Haviland,
Srinath Reddy Kethireddy & Alyssa T. Yamarmotot
To achieve justice for violations of international aw such
as genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, it is essential to address complicity for international
crimes. Beginning in the 1990s, there was a proliferation of
international and hybrid criminal tribunals, which sought to
hold perpetrators of these crimes accountable and, in turn,
generated an explosion of international criminal law jurispru-
dence. Nonetheless, the contours of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity in international criminal law remain contested. Courts-
both domestic and international-have long struggled to iden-
tify the proper legal standard for holding actors liable for aid-
ing and abetting even the most serious violations of
international itw. That confusion has, in turn, produced in-
consistent decisions. In the United States, for example, it has
resulted in a circuit split, leading many to predict the issue will
only be resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court.
This Article aims to provide context and clarity in this area
of international aw. It explains and categorizes the existing
jurisprudence on aiding and abetting, based on a comprehen-
sive survey of every case decided by an international or hy-
brid criminal tribunal since Nuremberg. It argues that the
search by U.S. courts for a single standard for aiding and
abetting liability under international law when deciding cases
arising under the Allen Tort Statute misunderstands the na-
ture of the aiding and abetting jurisprudence-and, indeed,
misunderstands the structure of international criminal law
more generally. It explains that differentiated standards for
aiding and abetting liability are often a result ofpurposive and
functiohal pluralism. Put simply, different standards may be
appropriate for different contexts. What appears to be a dis-
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continuous and contradictory jurisprudence is, in fact, a set of
calibrated standards that are often responsive to the particu-
lar context at hand The Article concludes with recommenda-
tions for strengthening and enabling this functional pluralism
in order to strengthen and enable international justice.
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In the summer of 1999, Sudanese air forces armed with
"payloads of death and displacement" bombed United Nations
relief sites, clinics, churches, and civilian residences.I Thanks
to foreign sovereign immunity, the Sudanese government and
its agents were immune from suit in foreign courts.
2 But the
victims learned that the airstrips and fuel used by the Suda-
nese warplanes had been provided by the Canadian oil corpo-
ration, Talisman Energy, and in 2001, they brought suit
against the corporation in the United States under the Alien
1 CAN. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMAN SECURITY IN SUDAN: THE REPORT OF A
CANADIAN ASSESSMENT MISSION 16 (2000); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SUDAN, OIL, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 6 (2003), https://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/sudanll03/sudan-
print.pdf [https://perma.cc/3VV5-GSZMI.
2 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d
289, 342 n.42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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Tort Statute.3 The victims accused Talisman Energy of aiding
and abetting the Sudanese government's commission of geno-
cide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.4
They lost.5 The District Court for the Southern District of
New York and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals both found
that Talisman Energy had knowingly aided the Sudanese mili-
tary in its prolonged campaign of death and destruction.6 But
that was not enough. The courts refused to hold Talisman
Energy liable because they concluded that an aider or abettor
of an international crime must act with the "purpose [of facili-
tating the commission of the underlying crime] rather than
knowledge alone."7
The case was only one in a series of cases in which U.S.
courts have struggled to identify the proper legal standard for
holding actors liable for aiding and abetting the most serious
violations of international law. Courts have persistently found
the varied standards for aiding and abetting liability under
international law deeply confusing. That confusion has, in
turn, led to inconsistent decisions by the courts.8 While the
Fourth Circuit has agreed with the Second Circuit that an aider
or abettor must act with purpose,9 the Eleventh and D.C. Cir-
cuits have held that knowledge alone is sufficient to establish
liability.1 0 This circuit split has led many to predict the issue
3 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman En-
ergy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009).
4 Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 247, 251.
5 Id. at 263.
6 Id. at 265.
7 Id. at 259 (emphasis added).
8 See generally Chimene I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Allen Tort
Cases, 60 HASTNGS L.J. 61 (2008) (detailing confusion and uncertainty among
federal courts in determining standards for complicity in ATS cases). Another
possibility is that the courts are not confused, but are cherry-picking among the
cases to support the result they wish to reach. If so, then the inconsistent deci-
sions are not a result of confusion, but of intentional misuse of precedent. Either
way, the argument here holds: courts should recognize that different international
and hybrid tribunals serve different purposes and those different purposes lead to
different standards for aiding and abetting.
9 Aziz v. Alcolac, Inc., 658 F.3d 388, 401 (4th Cir. 2011) ("Wle agree with the
Second Circuit that a purpose standard alone has gained 'the requisite accept-
ance among civilized nations for application in an action under the ATS.'").
10 See, e.g., Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 39 (D.C. Cir. 2011),
vacated, 527 F. App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (determining that aiding and abetting
only requires knowledge, based on customary international law); Cabello v. Fer-
nandez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1159 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that the defendant's
knowledge that he was "assisting in wrongful activity" was sufficient to establish
that he aided and abetted the victim's killing).
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will only be resolved when the U.S. Supreme Court finally
weighs in."
This Article aims to provide much-needed context and clar-
ity in this area of international law. It shows that the search by
U.S. courts for a single standard for aiding and abetting liabil-
ity within customary international law misunderstands the na-
ture of aiding and abetting jurisprudence in international law
and, indeed, misunderstands the structure of international
criminal law as a general matter.
This issue is deeply important not simply because of the
U.S. circuit split. Since ancient times, prohibitions against
complicity have been used to hold actors responsible for "aid-
ing and abetting" wrongful acts committed by others.
1 2 Today,
liability for complicity is common to all mature legal systems.
Prohibitions against aiding and abetting internationally wrong-
ful acts are commonplace in every specialized area of interna-
tional law, including international humanitarian law,
transboundary tort law, and international human rights law.'
3
11 See, e.g., David Scheffer, The Impact of the War Crimes Tribunals on Corpo-
rate Liability for Atrocity Crimes under US Law, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY?: HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NEW GLOBAL ECONOMY 152, 165 (Charlotte Walker-Said &
John D. Kelly eds., 2015) ("In the future, the Supreme Court may be asked to
resolve the circuit split within the federal circuits."); Angela Walker, The Hidden
Flaw in Kiobel: Under the Alien Tort Statute the Mens Rea Standard for Corporate
Aiding and Abetting is Knowledge, 10 Nw. J. INT'L HUM. RTs. 119, 121 (2011)
("While subject matter jurisdiction is currently the issue before the Supreme
Court, the mens rea standard follows on its heels as the next most pressing ATS
issue.").
12 Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 181
(1994).
13 A form of secondary liability exists in the international law of state respon-
sibility as well. Article 16 of the Draft Article on State Responsibility provides, "A
State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally
wrongful act by the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if:
(a) that State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the
internationally wrongful act; and
(b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that
State.
Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, art. 16, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the
Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/ 10, at 65 (2001) (emphasis ad-
ded). The Commentary to these Articles provides several examples of actions that
would give rise to aiding and assisting liability: "knowingly providing an essential
facility or financing the activity in question;" "providing means for the closing of
an international waterway;" "facilitating the abduction of persons on foreign soil;"
"assisting in the destruction of property belonging to nationals of a third country."
Id. at 66. The Commentary further provides that allowing another state to launch
attacks from state territory can constitute aid and assistance. Id. Some jurists
have sought to bridge the concept of "aiding and abetting" in international crimi-
nal law with that of "aiding and assisting" in the law of state responsibility. This
Article assumes a sharp distinction between the two concepts, however. Namely,
1596
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It is essential, too, to the possibility of criminal liability in the
ICC.14
Addressing complicity through aiding and abetting liability
attends to the goals of justice. It ensures that all actors that
contribute to the commission of a wrongful act are held ac-
countable, and it deters complicity in future international
crimes. Further, as a practical matter, addressing complicity is
a key avenue for seeking justice amidst jurisdictional and other
obstacles to holding direct perpetrators responsible for viola-
tions of international law-be they states, powerful individuals,
or nonstate entities. For these reasons, getting the law of aid-
ing and abetting "right" is necessary for proper international
legal accountability.
These questions may be newly pressing, but they are not
new. In international criminal law, some form of aiding and
abetting liability has been recognized since the first recognition
of the general principle of individual criminal responsibility.
The emergence of international criminal law in the aftermath of
the Second World War and the proliferation of international
criminal tribunals elevated the importance of complicity in in-
ternational criminal law. 15 Still, the exact contours of secon-
dary liability in international criminal law remain contested. 16
the law of individual responsibility diverges from the law of state responsibility on
the need for a subjective or "mental element" captured in the mens rea prong and
a de minimis concern with questions of attribution. Although this Article focuses
solely on the "aiding and abetting" context, many of the conclusions that emerge
here apply equally well to "aiding and assisting" context.
14 The issue was central to the ICC's investigation of potential war crimes and
crimes against humanity by U.S. nationals in Afghanistan. Preliminary Examina-
tion: Afghanistan, INT'L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/Afghanistan [https://
perma.cc/N9AK-AHWN] (last visited Feb. 18, 2019). That investigation has since
been rejected by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Pre-Trial Chamber II, Situation in the
Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Case No. ICC-02/17-33, Decision Pursuant to
Art. 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorisation of an Investigation into the
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Apr. 12, 2019), https://
www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/international-criminal-
court-afghanistan.pdf [https://perma.cc/VK86-J9AW] (last visited Apr. 12,
2019).
15 See MARINA AKSENOVA, COMPLICITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 53-80
(2016).
16 See generally Doug Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights
Violations: Confusion in the Courts, 6 Nw. J. INT'L HuM. Rrs. 304 (2008) (discussing
the debate over the definition of "aiding and abetting"); Janine Natalya Clark,
'Specific Direction' and the Fragmentation of International Jurisprudence on Aiding
and Abetting: Perisic and Beyond, 15 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 411 (2015) (discussing
fragmentation in aiding and abetting liability jurisprudence); Teddy Nemeroff,
Untying the Khulumanl Knot: Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the
Alien Tort Clains Act After Sosa, 40 COLUM. HuM. RTS. L. REv. 231 (2008) (discuss-
ing confusion in addressing aiding and abetting liability under the Alien Tort
Statute); Leila Nadya Sadat, Can the ICTY Salnovit and Perigit Cases Be Recon-
2019] 1597
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This Article examines how different conceptions of aiding
and abetting liability have taken root in international, hybrid,
and domestic tribunals. It counsels in favor of clarity but
against seeking uniformity where it does not-and should
not-exist. It explains that differentiated standards for aiding
and abetting liability are often a result of functional pluralism.
Put simply, different standards may be appropriate to different
contexts. Laying out the rich tapestry of international criminal
law makes clearer the varied roles of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity. This Article aims to show that what appears to be a discon-
tinuous and contradictory jurisprudence is, in fact, a set of
calibrated standards that are often responsive to the particular
context at hand. 17
Part I of this Article describes the current state of aiding
and abetting liability in international criminal law. This
description is informed by a comprehensive survey of every
case decided by an international or hybrid criminal tribunal
since Nuremberg (summarized in the Appendix). It begins by
situating aiding and abetting jurisprudence against the back-
drop of the progressive development of international criminal
law in the late twentieth century. Part I then turns to the
different standards of aiding and abetting liability that exist
under international criminal law today. This Part aims not
only to provide a landscape of the relevant standards, but also
to clarify the areas of ambiguity and fragmentation. It shows
that within the actus reus element of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity, tribunals have diverged over the need for assistance to be
specifically directed at the principal's crime and over the re-
quirement that the assistance have a substantial effect on its
commission. The mens rea element is even more fragmented,
with courts taking divergent approaches to whether the aider
or abettor must render her assistance with the knowledge, in-
ciled?, 108 AM. J. INT'L L. 475, 478 (2014) (discussing the "Jurisprudential debate
between the two differently constituted appeals chambers" of the ICTY).
17 This Article touches on two larger debates taking place within international
legal scholarship. The first relates to patterns of fragmentation, pluralism, and
harmonization among standards in international law. Scholars have waged these
debates on both descriptive and normative terms in disparate areas of interna-
tional law, such as international criminal law, or questions of attribution in the
law of state responsibility. These comparative debates also raise issues of con-
tinuity, calibration, and change in international law. A second debate relates to
complicity in other settings, such as aiding and assisting in the law of state
responsibility or individual liability for war crimes or crimes against humanity in
recent military operations (see, for example, the ICC's ongoing investigation in
Afghanistan). Both debates lurk in the background of this Article, but in the
interest of a focused discussion, they are not treated rigorously.
[Vol. 104:15931598
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tent, or purpose of facilitating the principal's crime. Part I ends
with an examination of what customary international law iden-
tifies as the standard for complicity, with the caveat that as
doctrinal consistency crumbles, custom declines in importance
in international criminal law.
Part II explains how and why fragmentation in aiding and
abetting came to pass. The answer is twofold. On the one
hand, the process of negotiating international instruments has
sometimes produced standards that are best understood as a
negotiated compromise. In particular, the laborious drafting
and negotiation process of the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court sought to harmonize various approaches
to criminal law across the civil and common law systems. Fur-
ther, states were wary of creating any future liability for their
own personnel and officials. These competing interests pro-
duced a standard that departed from the previously prevailing
aiding and abetting standards, resulting in significant confu-
sion. But it would be a mistake to assume that all the differ-
ences are haphazard. The existing state of fragmentation
largely reflects functional differences among the international
criminal tribunals. Fragmentation, in other words, is not nec-
essarily a problem that needs to be fixed. Instead, it is impor-
tant to situate the different aiding and abetting standards in
context, to determine if the different standards are responsive
to different functional purposes. This Part also examines the
consequences of forced harmonization in the context of the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS). It argues that judges should appreci-
ate the pluralistic nature of aiding and abetting standards in
international law when selecting the appropriate standard.
Part III contends that the varied aiding and abetting stan-
dards often exemplify the functional pluralism of international
criminal law. This argument pays particular attention to the
special case of the Rome Statute as a functionally distinctive
international tribunal. Yes, the aiding and abetting standard
in the Rome Statute is the result of a negotiating process that
produced nonstandard terminology. But beneath the surface,
the negotiators were motivated by a particular view of the func-
tional role of the International Criminal Court. As a result,
understanding the Rome Statute as an effort to codify custom-
ary international law at the time it was drafted is a mistake.
And looking to the standard articulated in the Statute as indic-
ative of the proper standard for aiding and abetting in interna-
tional criminal law more generally-as some U.S. courts have
done-is a mistake. This Part concludes by arguing that this
2019]1 1599
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problem of forced harmonization is not limited to the aiding
and abetting context, but is true more generally in interna-
tional criminal law. In the process, it offers a normative justifi-
cation for functional pluralism, as opposed to forced
harmonization.
Finally, the Article concludes by offering recommendations
for reconciling functional pluralism with the need to operation-
alize a standard for aiding and abetting liability. What is prob-
lematic is not the existence of different aiding and abetting
standards per se, but rather the lack of consistency in the
definition and interpretation of specific terms. This Part exam-
ines several ways in which a common terminology could be
developed and codified.18 It argues for the codification and
progressive development of international criminal law, particu-
larly with respect to the relevant mens rea terminology, to en-
able, rather than eliminate, pluralism.
I
AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
This Part surveys how aiding and abetting liability has de-
veloped since the end of the Second World War. It examines
the jurisdictional statutes and practice of international and
hybrid criminal tribunals and how they define actus reus and
mens rea, the constituent elements of criminal liability, for
aiding and abetting. It begins with the emergence of aiding and
abetting liability in modern international criminal law at Nu-
remberg. It describes the attempts to expressly spell out the
actus reus and mens rea prongs of accomplice liability by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR), established in 1993 and 1994, re-
spectively-and the tribunals and courts that followed. Be-
cause the standards were not codified in their statutes, these
tribunals developed standards from the bench. This Part ex-
plains and describes the fragmentation that resulted.
18 Some international criminal law scholars have proposed developing a "gen-
eral part" for international criminal law, while others have questioned key prem-
ises behind such an undertaking. Compare Kai Ambos, Remarks on the General
Part of International Criminal Law, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JusT. 660, 661 (2006) ("The
necessity for a GP is generally recognized."), with Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The
Pluralism of Irternational Criminal Law, 86 IND. L.J. 1063, 1064 (2011) (proposing
a "pluralistic account of substantive international criminal law").
[Vol. 104:15931600
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A. Emergence of Aiding and Abetting Liability
After the Second World War, the international community
recognized that it was not enough to hold accountable only
those who directly committed criminal acts. Other modes of
responsibility were required to impose liability on those who
were responsible for, but did not directly commit, international
crimes.'9 The key question was not whether there would be
aiding and abetting liability, but how to operationalize it. What
thresholds or standards should be used when trying an alleged
aider or abettor?
In answering this question, the progenitors of modern in-
ternational criminal law looked first to the jurisprudence of
complicity in domestic criminal law. The first international
criminal tribunals adapted the aiding and abetting liability
standards that had developed in domestic law and "trans-
planted [them] to the realm of international criminal law."20
Yet, this effort to transplant domestic law standards was far
from a simple fix, for there were substantial differences be-
tween domestic criminal law standards-both within and
across individual domestic legal systems.2 1
Although there is some history to accomplice liability in
international law-for instance, the Fourth Hague Convention
on Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land (1907)
provided an elementary form of aiding and abetting liability-
the development began in earnest with the work of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunals after the Second World War.2 2 The
Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals specifically
assigned individual responsibility to "accomplices participating
19 By way of contrast with domestic criminal law, Marina Aksenova explains:
"Because international criminal law targets organized, large-scale offending, the
distance between the accomplice and the harm is usually greater when compared
to the regular domestic law situations." AKSENOVA, supra note 15, at 2.
20 Elies van Sliedregt, The Curious Case of International Criminal Liability, 10
J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1171, 1174 (2012).
21 See AKSENOVA, supra note 15, at 76 ("The drafters of the Nuremberg Charter
came from different legal and political cultures. The need to compromise shaped
not only the language of the constituent documents, but also the charges against
the accused and the final judgments."); Solis Horwitz, The Tokyo Thal, 28 INT'L
CONCILIATION 475, 540 (1950).
22 See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of war on Land (Hague
IV) art. 1, 19, 43, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277; ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 182 (2d ed. 2005) (-The notion was clearly set out that a military
commander is criminally liable as an aider and abetter, if he tolerated-that is,
failed to stop or repress the commission of war crimes by his subordinates."). The
Supreme Court relied, in part, on the Fourth Hague Convention to find superior
liability in In re Yamashlita, 327 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1946). See CASSESE, supra,
183-84.
20 19] 160 1
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in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy
to commit [a crime defined in the Charter]."23 As Judge
Katzmann of the U.S. Second Circuit has observed, the term
"accomplices" in the International Military Tribunal Charter
should be understood as imposing liability upon aiders and
abettors.24 Commentators disagree about whether accomplice
liability in the Charter pertains specifically to accomplices in a
"common plan or conspiracy" or generalizes to aiding and abet-
ting an individual internationally criminally wrongful act. Re-
gardless, it is clear that the postwar operationalization of
criminal responsibility in international law included at least
some form of aiding and abetting liability.
The Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were
not alone in providing for aiding and abetting liability. Control
Council Law No. 10, which authorized the subsequent Nurem-
berg military trials, provided that a person was "deemed to
have committed a crime . .. if he was (a) a principal or (b) an
accessory to the comnssion of any such crime, or ordered or
abetted the same."2 5 In 1948, the Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and
Others (Einsatzgruppen), a military tribunal convened under
Control Council Law No. 10, required that the assistance ren-
dered must have a substantial effect on the principal's crime.26
To establish mens rea, it required mere "knowledge," rather
than the more stringent mens rea standard of "intent."27 The
same standard for accessory liability-knowing provision of
substantial assistance-was used to both convict and acquit
defendants in United States v. Flick, United States v. Von Weiz-
saecker (The Ministries Case), the German case of LG Hech-
ingen, the Trial of Franz Schonfeld and Nine Others, and United
States v. Krauch (I.G. Farben).2 8
23 Andrea Reggio, Aiding and Abetting in International Criminal Law: The Re-
sponsibility of Corporate Agents and Businessmen for "Trading with the Enemy" of
Mankind, 5 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 623, 630 n.24 (2005).
24 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 272 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzmann, J., concurring).
25 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity art. II, § 2.
26 "The Einsatzgruppen Case," in 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NU-
ERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10, 526 (1948).
27 Id. at 572.
28 Landgericht Hechingen [LG Hechingen] [District Court of Hechingen] (Kls
23/47) June 28, 1947, 1 Justiz und NS-Verbrechen [JuNSV] 471 (Lfd. Nr. 022),
2008, translated in Modes of Participation in Crimes Against Humanity, 7 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 131 (2009); Trial of Schonfeld and Nine Others, British Military Court,
Essen, June 11 th-26th, 1946, in 11 LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 64,
66-67 (1949); United States v. Flick, in 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10, at 1187 (1949);
1602 [Vol. 104:1593
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During this period, other international instruments contin-
ued to develop aiding and abetting liability under international
criminal law. For instance, the 1948 Convention on the Pre-
vention and Suppression of Genocide criminalized "complicity
in genocide."2 9 In the 1950 Nuremberg Principles, the newly-
formed International Law Commission stated that complicity
was a crime per se under international law.3 0 And the Interna-
tional Law Commission's 1954 Draft Code of Crimes against
the Peace and Security of Mankind listed "complicity" as an
offence, but did not clarify its precise meaning.3 1
At this point, international criminal law largely fell into a
state of dormancy, in no small part due to the Cold War. But in
1981, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 36/106
(1981), which urged the International Law Commission to re-
sume work on the Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and
Security of Mankind.3 2 The International Law Commission,
under the helm of Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam, took up
this charge.3 3 In its thirty-fifth session in 1983, the Commis-
sion agreed that the draft code should include an introduction
restating the general principles of criminal law, including the
role of complicity.34 The 1991 Draft Code stated, in Article 3(2),
that "[a]n individual who aids, abets or provides the means for
the commission of a crime against the peace and security of
mankind or conspires in or directly incites the commission of
such a crime is responsible therefor and liable to punish-
ment."3 5 The International Law Commission did not define the
standards for aiding and abetting liability but instead simply
United States v. Krauch (The I.G. Farben Case), 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL IAw No. 10, at 1081
(1949); United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), in 14 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10, at 1008 (1949).
29 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
art. III(e), Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 280.
30 Int'l Law Comm'n, Principles of Int'l Law Recognized in the Charter of the
Nuremberg Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal, Principle VII, Rep. of
the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of Its Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/1316
(1950).
31 Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, art. 2(13)(11), Rep. on the Work of Its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/2693
(1954).
32 G.A. Res. 36/106, 91 1 (Dec. 10, 1981).
33 Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of Its Thirty-
Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/38/10 (1983).
34 Id.




noted that "complicity . . . was a legal term with equivalent
meaning in most legal systems."3 6
During the next two decades, international aiding and
abetting jurisprudence fragmented amidst a proliferation of
draft codes, statutes, and judgments of international and hy-
brid criminal tribunals. In 1993 and 1994, the United Nations
Security Council established the ICTY and ICTR.3 7 This period
saw the first attempts to expressly spell out the mens rea and
actus reus prongs of accomplice liability. This was at least
partly because the statutes of previous international criminal
tribunals did not establish "aiding and abetting" as a separate
basis for individual criminal responsibility. If they had, the
statutes would have specified separate mens rea and actus
reus standards for primary and secondary liability. Instead,
the almost-identically worded statutes of the ICTY and ICTR-
and the hybrid tribunals that followed, namely, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone and Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia-simply stated that "[a] person who
planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and
abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime ...
shall be individually responsible for the crime."3 8 Because
neither the ICTY nor the ICTR statutes included a substantive
mens rea or actus reus requirement, the Trial and Appellate
Chambers of the ICTY developed aiding and abetting standards
from the bench. In the process, as the following section ex-
plains, their jurisprudence diverged from prevailing aiding and
abetting standards.
The International Law Commission issued a new version of
the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
36 Id. at 188.
37 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); Statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the International Crim-
inal Tribunal for Rwanda).
38 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, art. 7(1), S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); Statute of the International Tribu-
nal for Rwanda, art. 6(1), S.C. Res. 955, Annex (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(1), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137, 195;
see also Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea art. 29, Oct. 27, 2004, ECCC Doc. No. NS/RKM/1004/006
("Any Suspect who planned, instigated, ordered, aided and abetted, or committed




Mankind in 1996.39 In this newest iteration, the Commission
concluded that lan individual shall be responsible for a crime
set out in articles 17, 18, 19 or 20 if that individual ... know-
ingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substan-
tially, in the commission of such a crime, including providing
the means for its commission."40 The official commentary to
this provision traces the evolution of the principle of individual
criminal responsibility across history, finding that Article
2(3)(d) is
consistent with the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (art.
6), the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (art. III, subpara. (e)), the statute of the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (art. 7,
para. 1) and the statute of the International Tribunal for
Rwanda (art. 6, para. 1).41
This was the first time that an effort at documenting and har-
monizing aiding and abetting liability in international criminal
law had waded into the territory of defining the proper actus
reus and mens rea.
The subsequent adoption of the Rome Statute establishing
the International Criminal Court in 1998 represented the most
ambitious effort to legislate aiding and abetting liability under
international criminal law to date. However, the Rome Statute
also marked the greatest divergence from the various aiding
and abetting standards developed in previous years. The Stat-
ute contained a mens rea requirement of "purpose,"42 in con-
trast to the "knowledge" standard developed by the ad hoc
tribunals and the 1996 Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and
Security of Mankind. Further complicating the picture, the
series of hybrid tribunals that emerged in the late 1990s and
2000s modified both the subjective and objective elements of
accessory liability. The next section explains the divergent
standards produced by the modern international and hybrid
criminal tribunals-standards that these tribunals continue to
apply today.
39 Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of
Mankind, art. 2(3)(d), Rep. of the Int'l Law Comm'n on the Work of its Forty-Eighth
Session, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996).
40 1I (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 21. The Commentary further notes that "Itihis principle is also con-
sistent with the Nfirnberg Principles (Principle VII) and the 1954 draft Code (art.
2, para. 13 (iii))." Id.
42 As is discussed in greater length in Part III, the precise. meaning of "pur-
pose" is a matter of substantial disagreement among scholars and uncertainty in
the jurisprudence of the Court to date. See Rome Statute art. 25(3)(c), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
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B. Fragmentation of Aiding and Abetting Standards
The ad hoc tribunals, hybrid tribunals, and permanent
International Criminal Court (ICC) all have their own aiding
and abetting liability standards. These standards are rarely
specified in the jurisdictional statutes. The statutes of the ICTY
and ICTR, as well as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, only
briefly stipulate that, "[A] person who planned, instigated, or-
dered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the plan-
ning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in ... the
present Statute, shall be individually responsible for the
crime."4 3 Similarly, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon Statute
provides only general guidance, stating, "A person shall be in-
dividually responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the
Special Tribunal if that person . . . participated as accom-
plice . . . [in] the crime set forth in article 2 of this Statute.""
Therefore, jurisprudence, rather than incipient statutes, is the
key source for understanding aiding and abetting liability for
these tribunals.
The Statute of the International Criminal Court, by con-
trast, specifically defines aiding and abetting liability. Article
25(3)(c) of the Rome Statute creates liability where the accused
person, "[flor the purpose of facilitating the commission of such
a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in its commission or its
attempted commission, including providing the means for its
commission."4 5 This provision involves several innovations-
including the addition of the phrase "purpose of facilitating"-
that diverge from the jurisprudentially developed standard of
the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals, and have led to subsequent
interpretative debates.
Every tribunal requires two elements of criminal liability
for aiding and abetting: an act or omission that assists or abets
the commission of a principal crime (the actus reus compo-
nent); and a specified state of mind with respect to one's effect
43 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res. 827, art. 7(1); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 6(1); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art.
6(1); see also Law on the Establishment of Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts
of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed During the Period of Demo-
cratic Kampuchea, supra note 38, art. 29 ("Any Suspect who planned, instigated,
ordered, aided and abetted, or committed the crimes referred to in. .. this law
shall be individually responsible for the crime.").
44 Special Tribunal for Lebanon Statute, S.C. Res. 1757, Attachment art.
3(1)(a) (May 20, 2007).
45 Rome Statute art. 25(3)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
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on the underlying crime (the mens rea component). But within
the international and hybrid courts the standards applied to
define those two elements range widely, particularly with re-
gard to mens rea.
Among international and hybrid criminal tribunals, inter-
pretations of aiding and abetting liability differ in two key re-
spects. First, the tribunals have different actus reus
standards. The ad hoc tribunals, as well as the Special Court
for Sierra Leone and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, all require that the alleged act of aiding or abetting
has a "substantial effect" on the commission of the principal
crime.46 Meanwhile, the ICC and Special Tribunal for Lebanon
both set a lower bar.
Second, the tribunals embrace different mens rea require-
ments. The ICTY, ICTR, Special Court for Sierra Leone, and
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia only re-
quire that aider or abettors have "knowledge" that their act will
assist the commission of the underlying crime. In contrast, the
ICC requires that the aider and abettor have the "purpose" of
facilitating the commission of the underlying crime.4 7 The Spe-
cial Tribunal for Lebanon goes even further than the ICC, ex-
pressly requiring that the aider or abettor must "intend" to
assist the principal perpetrator in the commission of an under-
lying crime.4 8 But it is important to note that, in doing so, the
hybrid tribunal is adopting standards used in Lebanese domes-
tic criminal law, not international law.
This fragmentation in aiding and abetting standards
among international and hybrid criminal tribunals has re-
sulted in substantial confusion for scholars and courts. Some-
times, this confusion even extends to the tribunals themselves.
For instance, until recently, the ICTY fluctuated for more than
a decade between adopting and rejecting the "specific direction"
actus reus requirement for aiding and abetting liability. The
inconsistent precedents in the opinions of ICTY judges might
merely reflect the process of judge-created law and unstable
precedents. Today, however, the standards for aiding and
46 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Blagkie, IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, T 46 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v. Rukundo,
ICTR-2001-70-A, Appeal Judgment, ' 52 (Oct. 20, 2010); Prosecutor v. Taylor,
Case No. SCSL-03-01-T-1283, Trial Judgment, q1 482 (Apr. 26, 2012); Prosecutor
v. Kaing, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment (July 26, 2010).
47 See Rome Statute art. 25(3)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
48 Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Case No. STL- 1-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the
Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative
Charging, ¶ 221 (Feb. 16, 2011).
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abetting are relatively settled within the various tribunals, even
though they diverge in certain respects from one another.
Table 1, below, provides a simplified roadmap of the actus
reus and mens rea elements of aiding and abetting liability
developed by major international, ad hoc, and hybrid criminal
tribunals. While it provides clarity, the table is merely a snap-
shot; it is not meant to suggest hat these standards are static.
A comprehensive summary of -all of the modem international
and hybrid tribunals' aiding and abetting cases that underlie
this table and the summary that follows, is provided in the
Appendix. A closer look at the opinions from each judicial in-
stitution reflects a more nuanced and meandering evolution of
aiding and abetting jurisprudence. For example, even where
relatively settled terminology for aiding and abetting standards
has developed over time, the precise contours of these terms
can be interpreted inconsistently even within tribunals. The
following section discusses the differences among the tribunals




TABLE 1: AIDING AND ABETTING STANDARDS
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
BY INTERNATIONAL
Tribunal Actus Reus Mens Rea
Standard Standard
ICTY Acts specifically Knowledge that
directed to assist the acts assist
that have a the commission
substantial effect on of the principal
the principal crime crime
ICTR Acts specifically Knowledge that
directed to assist the acts assist
that have a the commission
substantial effect on of the principal
the principal crime crime
SPECIAL COURT Assistance with a Knowledge that
FOR SIERRA substantial effect on the acts assist
LEONE the principal crime the commission
of the principal
crime
EXTRAORDINARY Assistance with a Knowledge that
CHAMBERS IN substantial effect on the acts assist
THE COURTS OF the principal crime the commission
CAMBODIA of the principal
crime
ICC Assistance with an Purpose to
effect on the facilitate the
principal crime commission of
the principal
cnme
SPECIAL Contributes to the Intent to assist
TRIBUNAL FOR commission of the the principal
LEBANON principal crime in crime and
one of many knowledge of that
enumerated ways; perpetrator's
no requirement of intent
substantial effect.
1. Actus Reus
The major international and hybrid criminal tribunals
share several similarities in how they approach the actus reus
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for aiding and abetting. For example, the act-or omission
4 9-
of aiding and abetting may take place before, during, or after
the principal crime.50 Additionally, the tribunals generally rec-
ognize that the act of aiding is legally distinct from abetting.
Aiding involves helping the principal perpetrator to commit a
crime, whereas abetting involves facilitating or instigating the
commission of the principal crime. As the ICC has helpfully
clarified, with reference to the case law of the ad hoc tribunals,
"[The notion of 'abet' describes the moral or psychological as-
sistance of the accessory to the principal perpetrator, taking
the form of encouragement of or even sympathy for the com-
mission of the particular offense."5 1 Conversely, "aiding implies
the provision of practical or material assistance" to the princi-
pal perpetrator.5 2
Yet despite these baseline similarities, there is fragmenta-
tion in the development of an actus reus standard of aiding and
abetting liability, particularly in the requirement of "substan-
tial effect."5 3 The ad hoc tribunals, as well as the Special Court
49 The failure to act-i.e., omission-may fulfill the actus reus requirement.
In the Oric case, for example, the ICTY Appeals Chamber clarified that "omission
proper may lead to individual criminal responsibility under Article 7(1) of the
[ICTY] Statute where there is a legal duty to act." While there is no clear, detailed
standard for a conviction for omission in aiding and abetting, the Appeals Cham-
ber continued, "at a minimum, the offender's conduct would have to meet the
[other] basic elements of aiding and abetting." Prosecutor v. Oric, Case No. IT-03-
68-A, Appeals Judgment, T 43 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3,
2008) (citing Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeals Judgment,
T 274 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007); Prosecutor v.
Galk, Case No. IT-98-29-A, Appeals Judgment, T 175 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2006); Prosecutor v. Ntagerura, ICTR-99-46-A, Ap-
peals Judgment, T% 659, 660 (Feb. 25, 2004); Prosecutor v. Blagkid, Case No. IT-
95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, 9 663 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
July 29, 2004)).
50 See Prosecutor v. Popovic, Case No. IT-05-88-A, Appeals Judgment, 1 1783
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 30, 2015); Prosecutor v. Mrkgit,
Case No. IT-95-13/1-A, Appeals Judgment, 1 81 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia May 5, 2009); Prosecutor v. Blaakil, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals
Judgment, T 48 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prose-
cutor v. Kalimanzira, ICTR-05-88-A, Appeals Judgment, n.238 (Oct. 20, 2010);
Nahimana v Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, Appeals Judgment, T 482 (Nov.
28, 2007); Prosecutor v. Bemba (Bemba Case), Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, 9 96
(Oct. 19, 2016); Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Deci-
sion in the Applicable Law: Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative
Charging, T 219 (Feb. 16, 2011).
51 Bemba Case, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, ¶ 89 (Oct. 19, 2016).
52 Id. % 88.
53 Another noteworthy area of fragmentation in the actus reus standard re-
lates to the "specific direction" element, which stipulates that the alleged act or
omission of aiding and abetting must be "specifically directed" to assist the under-
lying crimes of the principal perpetrator. This element emerged in the jurispru-
dence of the ICTY-starting with the seminal case Prosecutor v. Tadi6-but has
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for Sierra Leone and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia, require that the alleged acts or omissions have a
"substantial effect on the perpetration of [a] crime" provided for
in the Statute.5 4 In contrast, the ICC requires only assistance
with "an effect"; the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, in accor-
dance with Lebanese domestic criminal law, also does not re-
quire a substantial effect.55
Even though it is widely used, the precise contours of the
"substantial effect" test for actus reus remain unsettled.56 The
ICTR Trial Chamber in Furundfiya explained that "any marginal
participation" would not meet the substantiality requirement. 7
On the other hand, the ICTR Appeals Chamber in Ny-
iramasuhuko stated that the substantial effect requirement
need not involve the finding of a causal relationship in the
sense of a condition sine que non.5 8 Notably, failure to meet the
"substantial effect" requirement has rarely been a basis for
acquittal. The ad hoc tribunals have acquitted persons for the
lack of "substantial effect" in only two cases to date.59
since been rejected by every international criminal tribunal, including the ICTY
itself in 2014. Because the specific direction requirement appears to have been
decisively rejected by the courts, it is only mentioned in passing in this Article.
For an analysis of the now-widespread rejection of the specific direction element,
see James G. Stewart, Judicial Rejection of "Specific Direction" is Widespread,
JAMESGSTEWART.COM (Dec. 23, 2015), http://Jamesgstewart.com/udicial-rejec-
tion-of-specific-direction-is-widespread/ [https://perma.cc/A8P6-TEQ9].
54 See Prosecutor v. Bla~kit, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment, 1l 46
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004); Prosecutor v.
Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 52 (Oct. 20, 2010);
Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T-1283, Trial Judgment, '1 482 (Apr.
26, 2012); Prosecutor v. Kaing, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Judgment
(July 26, 2010).
55 See Bemba Case, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, 9 90 (Oct. 19, 2016); Prose-
cutor v. Ayyash, Case No. STL- 11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging,
91 219-20 (Feb. 16, 2011).
56 See, e.g., Ntawukulilyayo v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-05-82-A, Appeals
Judgment, ' 214 (Dec. 14, 2011) ("Whether a particular contribution qualifies as
'substantial' is a 'fact-based inquiry,' and need not 'serve as condition precedent-
for the commission of the crime.'" (citations omitted)); see Ines Peterson, Open
Questions Regarding Aiding and Abetting Liability in International Criminal Law: A
Case Study of ICTY and ICTR Jurisprudence, 16 INT'L CRIM. L. REv. 565, 568
(2016).
57 Prosecutor v. Furund~ija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judgment, q[ 231
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
58 See Prosecutor v. Nyiramasuhuko, Case No. ICTR-98-42-A, Appeals Judg-
ment, ¶ 2083 (Dec. 14, 2015).
59 See Peterson, supra note 56, at 569. In Kuprehici, the ICTY Appeals
Chamber acquitted Kupreskit, who had been convicted of assisting an attack
against Muslim civilians by unloading weapons from a car, due to insufficient
evidence that the same weapons were used in and thus substantially contributed
to the subsequent attack. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskie, Case No. IT-95-16-A,
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The ICC and the Special Tribunal for Lebanon do not re-
quire "substantial effect" to establish aiding and abetting liabil-
ity (though the Lebanese tribunal is clear that it applies
domestic, not international, law on the matter). The ICC Rome
Statute includes a weak actus reus element for aiding and
abetting that does not require "substantial" assistance,
6 0 di-
verging from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, as well
as the provisions stipulated by the International Law Conmis-
ston's 1996 Draft Code.6 1 Before the ICC ruled on the appro-
priate actus reus requirement for aiding and abetting liability,
scholars debated whether the Statute truly excluded the stan-
dard "substantial effect" requirement.62 In 2016, however, the
ICC settled the issue when it handed down two decisions that
rejected the substantial effect requirement.6 3 The Special Tri-
Appeals Judgment, 91 277 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 23,
2001). In Sainovid, the ICTY Appeals Chamber acquitted Lazarevit, who had been
convicted of assisting crimes committed by the Pri~tina Corps of the Army of
Yugoslavia (VJ) by failing to take adequate measures to secure proper investiga-
tions, because the alleged crimes were perpetrated pursuant to a JCE excluding
Lazarevit, i.e., his failure to act could not have had a substantial effect on the
subsequent commission of the principal crimes. See Prosecutor v. Sainovi, Case
No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Judgment, 919l 1676, 1679-82 with further references
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014).
60 Article 25(3)(c) reads:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally re-
sponsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the jurisdic-
tion of the Court if that person: ... (c) For the purpose of facilitating
the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or otherwise assists in
its commission or its attempted commission, including providing
the means for its commission.
See Rome Statute, art. 25(3)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
61 See ELIES VAN SLIEDREGT, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL
LAw 127 (2012); see also Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Code of Crimes against the
Peace and Security of Mankind with Commentaries, supra note 39, art. 2(3)
(1996) ("An individual shall be responsible for a crime ... if that individual ... (d)
Knowingly aids, abets or otherwise assists, directly and substantially, in the
commission of such a crime, including providing the means for its commission.").
62 For instance, the practitioner Sarah Finnin urged the ICC to follow the
"substantial effect" test applied at the ad hoc tribunals. SARAH FINNIN, ELEMENTS OF
AcCESSORIAL MODES OF LIABILITY: ARTICLE 25(3)(B) AND (C) OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 147 (2012). Conversely, Professor Kai Ambos sug-
gested that "the word 'facilitating' confirms that a direct and substantial assis-
tance is not necessary and that the act of assistance need not be a conditio sine
qua non of the crime." Kai Ambos, Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility, in
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 757 (Otto
Triffterer ed., 2d ed. 2008).
63 In Bemba, while the Trial Chamber of the ICC held that the act of assis-
tance must have "an effect on the commission of the offence," it did not adopt the
substantial effect test developed by the ICTY and ICTR. Prosecutor v. Bemba,
Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, Trial Judgment Pursuant to Article 72 of the Statute,
1 90 (Oct. 19, 2016). The Trial Chamber explained, "[Article 25(3)(c) of the Stat-
ute does not require the meeting of any specific threshold. The plain wording of
1612
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bunal for Lebanon stipulates a standard for the actus reus
component drawn from domestic law. That law outlines a vari-
ety of types of assistance or contribution to the principal crime
that would lead an accomplice to be guilty of a felony or misde-
meanor. The list does not specifically require that the assis-
tance have a "substantial effect."6 There is therefore a split
between the ICC and Special Tribunal for Lebanon, on the one
hand, and the ad hoc tribunals, the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, and Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambo-
dia, on the other, in their treatment of the actus reus
requirement.
2. Mens Rea
Mens rea encompasses the mental state required to estab-
lish criminal liability. The concept of mens rea developed in the
Anglo-American criminal tradition in response to a moral phi-
losophy that individuals with an "innocent mindset" should not
be found guilty of crimes.6 5 Prior to the development of the
legal concept of mens rea, one could be found guilty of a crime
based solely on physical conduct (the actus reus element). All
of the international and hybrid tribunals surveyed in this Arti-
cle require a mens rea element to establish aiding and abetting
liability. Yet the differences among them are pronounced. The
tribunals embrace three different mens rea standards: knowl-
the statutory provision does not suggest the existence of a minimum threshold."
Id. ¶ 93. The Trial Chamber in Bemba did acknowledge that two differently
constituted ICC tribunals had construed Article 25(3)(c) as requiring a substantial
effect element. Id. TT 91-92. However, those tribunals only tangentially dis-
cussed the requisite effect of assistance: The Pre-Trial Chamber I in
Mbarushimana declined to fully consider the aiding and abetting charges due to
insufficient evidence of the principal crime. The Chamber merely reflected in
dicta that "a substantial contribution to the crime may be contemplated." Prose-
cutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Confirma-
tion of Charges, T 279 (Dec. 16, 2011) (emphasis added). The Trial Chamber I in
Lubanga did imply that substantiality was required, but it only discussed aiding
and abetting liability in order to provide context for the distinct liability of co-
perpetrators. In other words, the Chamber in that case was not purporting to
enumerate a more broadly applicable standard. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyllo
Against his Conviction, ¶ 468 (Dec. 1, 2014). Similarly, in Al Mahdli, the Pre-Trial
Chamber expressly reaffirmed that the act of assistance need not be "'substantial'
or anyhow qualified other than by the required [mens real to facilitate the commis-
sion of the crime." Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges, T 26 (Mar. 24, 2016).
64 See Lebanese Criminal Code, art. 219, https://www.stl-tsl.org/sites/de
fault/files/documents/legal-documents/relevant-lebanese-law/CHATC- 150903-
2_OAR T_EN.pdf https://perma.cc/29KD-CJ2D].
65 Paul T. Robertson, Mens Rea, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE 1-5 (2014).
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edge, purpose, and intent. This section outlines the current
state of the jurisprudence.
a. Knowledge
The ad hoc tribunals, Special Court for Sierra Leone, and
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia have de-
veloped a relatively low mens rea threshold.6 6 According to
these tribunals, knowledge that one's conduct assists the com-
mission of the principal crime is sufficient to fulfill the requisite
mens rea for aiding and abetting.6 7 Such knowledge may be
actual or constructive,6 8 and may be inferred from the perpe-
trator's broader awareness,6 9 as well as "the relevant circum-
66 In Khieu, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia Appeals
Chamber adopted a very narrow interpretation of the aiding and abetting liability
standard, diverging from its preceding judgment in Kaing and the jurisprudence
of the ad hoc tribunals. While this Article treats Khieu as an outlier, the fragmen-
tation within the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia undoubt-
edly deserves greater attention elsewhere. See Prosecutor v. Khieu, Case No. 002/
19-09-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeals Judgment, 9 789 (Nov. 23, 2016); Prosecutor v.
Kaing, Case No. OO1/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Trial Judgment, q1 535 (July 26,
2010).
67 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 229
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) ("[Klnowledge that the
acts performed by the aider and abettor assist the commission of a specific crime
by the principal."): Prosecutor v. Karera, Case No. ICTR-01-74-A, Appeals Judg-
ment, 9 321 (Feb. 2, 2009) (same); Prosecutor v. Ngirabatware, Case No. MICT- 12-
29-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 158 (Dec. 18, 2014) ("[Klnowledge of the actual com-
mission of the crime is not required . . . where an accused is aware that one of a
number of crimes will probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact
committed, he has intended to facilitate the commission of that crime[.]"); Prose-
cutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 487 (Apr. 26, 2012)
("[Tihe Accused must have knowledge that his acts or omissions assist the perpe-
trator in the commission of the crime or underlying offense"); see also ROGER
O'KEEFE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 191 (2015) ("For its part, however, the Ap-
peals Chamber of the SCSL consistently relaxed this requirement by demanding
that the aider and abettor either knew or 'was aware of the substantial likelihood'
that his or her acts would assist in the commission of the crime." (citations
omitted)).
68 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Luki4e, Case No. IT-98-32/1-T, Trial Judgment,
9 900 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009) ("The mens rea
may be inferred from the circumstances"); Prosecutor v. Tadit, Case No. IT-94- 1-
T, Trial Judgment, q1 659 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997)
(acknowledging that knowledge may be "either actual or constructive"). According
to one commentator, "[slimilar statements of the law were subsequently repeated
in almost all the cases dealing with crimes against humanity, without any effort
ever having been made to define the exact meaning of 'constructive knowledge.'"
Johan D. Van der Vyver, The International Criminal Court and the Concept ofMens
Rea in International Criminal Law, U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 57, 67-68 (2005)
(footnote omitted).
69 Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgment,
¶¶ 162-64 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000).
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stances."7 0 For the purposes of liability, the aider and abettor
must also be aware of the "essential elements of the crime
ultimately committed by the principal."7 1
For those tribunals that apply the knowledge standard for
mens rea, the aider and abettor need not share the principal
perpetrator's intent.72 A higher mens rea standard may be
required, however, when the underlying crime is a specific in-
tent crime-that is, a crime requiring intent to commit an
abuse with a specific purpose.7 3 For example, in order for a
perpetrator to be held liable for aiding and abetting the crime of
persecution, the perpetrator must "be aware not only of the
crime whose perpetration he is facilitating but also of the dis-
criminatory intent of the [principal] perpetrators."7 4 Generally
speaking, however, the aider and abettor need only know that
his or her conduct assists the commission of a crime. Indeed,
in practice, the ad hoc tribunals' purported requirement of
"knowledge" is sometimes treated as something closer to a
more lenient "recklessness" standard.7 5 For example, the ICTY
recognized in Prosecutor v. Brdanin that mere awareness of the
risk that a number of different crimes might be committed
constitutes sufficient mens rea even if the individual had no
knowledge of the actual commission of one of those crimes.7 6
b. Purpose
The ICC's Rome Statute establishes a heightened mens rea
requirement for aiding and abetting liability-"purpose." Article
25(3)(c) of the Statute states:
In accordance with this Statute, a person shall be criminally
responsible and liable for punishment for a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court if that person.. . . [flor the purpose of
facilitating the commission of such a crime, aids, abets or
70 Prosecutor v. Lukid, Case No. IT-98-32/ 1-T, Trial Judgment, 1 902 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 20, 2009).
71 Id.
72 Id.; see Prosecutor v. Blagki, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Appeals Judgment,
T 49 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004).
73 See Robertson, supra note 65.
74 Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Appeals Judgment, T 52
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003).
75 See James G. Stewart, The End of 'Modes of Liability' for International
Crimes, 25 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 165, 192-94 (2012).
76 Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Trial Judgment, 1 272 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 1, 2014); see also Prosecutor v.
Ngirabatware, Case No. MICT-12-29-A, Appeals Judgment, ' 158 (Dec. 18, 2014)
("[Where an accused is aware that one of a number of crimes will probably be
committed, and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended to
facilitate the commission of that crime and is guilty as an aider and abettor.").
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otherwise assists in its commission or its attempted conmis-
sion, including providing the means for its commission.7 7
This standard is distinct from the "knowledge" standard used
by the ad hoc tribunals, Special Court for Sierra Leone, and
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia.7 8
The Rome Statute does not expressly define the term "pur-
pose." This is surprising considering that the more general
mens rea provision of the Rome Statute, Article 30, provides
definitions for two mens rea terms applicable to criminal liabil-
ity under the statute "[ulnless otherwise provided": "intent" and
"knowledge."7 9 As discussed in more detail in Part III, there
has been significant doctrinal confusion as to the relationship
between the "purpose" standard articulated for aiding and
abetting liability in Article 25(3)(c) and the "intent" and "knowl-
edge" standards separately outlined in Article 30.
Unfortunately, because there is limited ICC jurisprudence
on aiding and abetting liability under the Statute, it may be too
early to clarify the precise contours of the "purpose" element.
But the ICC has made clear that "purpose" is distinct from
"knowledge." As the ICC Trial Chamber explained in Prosecutor
v. Bemba,
["Purpose"] introduces a higher subjective mental element
and means that the accessory must have lent his or her
assistance with the aim of facilitating the offence. It is not
sufficient that the accessory merely knows that his or her
conduct will assist the principal perpetrator in the commis-
sion of the offence.a0
Hence, the Rome Statute's "purpose" standard establishes a
higher mens rea bar than the more common "knowledge"
standard.
c. Intent
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon stipulates yet another
mens rea standard, based on domestic law. Although the Tri-
bunal's statute does not specify a mens rea standard for aiding
77 Rome Statute art. 25(3)(c), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
78 Prosecutor v. Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, 9 281 (Dec. 16, 2011).
79 See Rome Statute art. 30, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. (emphasis
added).
80 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, Trial Judgment Pursu-
ant to Article 74 of the Statute, 1 97 (Oct. 19, 2016); see also Prosecutor v.
Mbarushimana, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/10, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, ¶ 281 (Dec. 16, 2011) (confirming that "purpose" is the requisite mens
rea standard under the Rome Statute).
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and abetting liability, the Tribunal clarified in a 2000 decision
that it would adopt the standard stipulated in the Lebanese
Criminal Code: "(i) knowledge of the intent of the perpetrator to
commit a crime; and (ii) intent to assist the perpetrator in his
comnuission of the crime."8 The Tribunal's conflict of laws
doctrine requires that whenever domestic and international
laws conflict, it must apply the narrower standard. In this
case, the domestic mens rea standard for aiding and abetting
liability was more stringent than the "knowledge" standard
common in international criminal law.8 2 Some scholars pre-
dict, however, that the Special Tribunal for Lebanon could
gravitate towards a broader standard in response to jurispru-
dential developments at the ICTY and Special Court for Sierra
Leone.83
II
THE CASE FOR FUNCTIONAL PLURALISM
The picture of current jurisprudence just provided might
lead some to conclude that the international law of aiding and
abetting is fragmented and incoherent and that international
lawyers should dedicate themselves to pressing toward uni-
form standards. But these differences are better understood,
we argue, as the result of functional differences that justify
different standards. International criminal law plays different
roles in different contexts. International and hybrid tribunals,
draft codes, and domestic statutory hooks for prosecuting in-
ternational crimes all evolved to meet very different needs. In
short, international criminal law is not needlessly fractured; it
is pluralistic, and properly so.
To call international criminal law pluralistic is to acknowl-
edge both its origin and its function. International criminal law
emerged out of centuries-old domestic criminal law traditions
81 Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Case No. STL- 11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the
Applicable Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative
Charging, '1 220 (Feb. 16, 2011) (citations omitted).
82 Id. ¶ 228.
83 Philippa Webb, Individual Criminal Responsibility, in THE SPECIAL TRIBUNAL




through legal transplantation,84 adaptation,85 and synthesis.8 6
Its role is complementary and adaptive, filling in gaps to stamp
out the worst crimes. It is therefore, by nature and necessity,
pluralistic. But that pluralism has not always been neat or
simple. Judge Patricia Wald observed that, although numer-
ous international tribunals have "flown the flag of customary
law, many new doctrines have grown up and many new fact
situations have been accommodated under old labels and ru-
brics."8 7 This has made the task of identifying customary in-
ternational criminal law particularly challenging.
This Part uses the lens of functional pluralism to explain
the departures in aiding and abetting standards, particularly
those found in the Rome Statute, as departures from custom
rather than departures of custom. Beginning with the Rome
Statute and then briefly examining other examples of plural-
ism, this Part thus distinguishes between evolutions and aber-
rations in international criminal law.
This Article not only argues that this approach is descrip-
tively the best way to understand the existing jurisprudence; it
also argues that there is normative value in the functional plu-
ralism. In this respect, we join those who have concluded that
sometimes "the search for consistency and uniformity in [inter-
national criminal law] is misguided."88 Some scholars have
84 See, e.g., Cassandra Steer, Legal Transplants or Legal Patchworking? The
Creation of International Criminal Law as a Pluralistic Body of Law, in PLURALISM IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 39-67 (Elies van Sliedregt & Sergey Vasiliev eds.,
2014) (describing the "comparative law notion of legal transplants" as a "useful
analytical tool").
85 See, e.g., John D. Jackson & Yassin M. Brunger, Fragmentation and Har-
monization in the Development of Evidentiary Practices in International Criminal
Tribunals, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 84, 156, 168
(describing the "dynamic" and "interaction" process of adaptation in which "the
practices that evolve do so in a manner that takes account of the international
environment and may be different from those that are associated with a particular
domestic tradition").
86 See, e.g., Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law:
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences,
12 CRIM. L.F. 291, 334 (2001) (referring to the "arduous task of comparative
criminal law synthesis" in the process of drafting international criminal law
statutes).
87 Patricia M. Wald, Tribunal Discourse and Intercourse: How the International
Courts Speak to One Another, 30 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 15, 26-27 (2007).
88 Greenawalt, supra note 18, at 1064; see also William W. Burke-White,
International Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 963, 965 (2004) ("{AIn emerging
international legal pluralism can be highly beneficial."). Professor Kevin John
Heller goes so far as to argue that fragmentation is inherent to international
criminal law, making any extrapolation of customary international law and gen-
eral principles precarious. In a book proposal, Heller writes, "In the context of
international criminal law, however, the 'correct' interpretation of the formal
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argued for harmonization through "Judicial globalization,"
whereby judges are assumed to act as "fellow professionals in a
profession that transcends national borders."8 9 To be sure,
there are good arguments in favor of harmonization in the law.
In particular, harmonization can make the law clearer and eas-
ier to discern. It also contributes to greater legitimacy and
often to greater justice for different courts to apply similar stan-
dards for the same crime. But the search for uniformity is also
at times problematic. Given the different notions of criminal
responsibility among distinct legal traditions and the func-
tional differences between international tribunals, the search
for a single unified aiding and abetting standard is neither
likely to succeed nor advisable.
Whatever the strengths and weaknesses of judge-led har-
monization in the abstract, in practice it has not yet proven
effective in the area of aiding and abetting liability. Viewing the
law through the lens of functional pluralism suggests that this
failure to fully harmonize across the tribunals could be for the
best. Pluralism captures two characteristics of international
criminal law that would be lost if there were perfect and uni-
form harmonization. First, pluralism enables different juris-
dictions prosecuting international crimes to pursue different
ends and to play different functional roles. Second, pluralism
appropriately captures the ways in which international crimi-
nal law is a hybrid of domestic and supranational functions of
criminal justice.
sources of international law-treaties, custom, general principles-has always
been deeply contested." Kevin Jon Heller, A Genealogy of International Criminal
Law 3 (May 11, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/05/22/new-book-project-a-
genealogy-of-international-criminal-law/genealogy-of-icl-book-proposal-final
[https://perma.cc/PE64-PPUW]. Keller cites a number of examples, including
the Appeals Chamber of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
which rejected former ad hoc tribunals' insistence that joint criminal enterprise
existed under customary international law. Keller argues, "These examples of
methodological conflict could be multiplied indefinitely." Id. He concludes that
the history of international criminal tribunals fails to "exhibit a coherent and
defensible methodology concerning the internationalization process." Id. Rather,
"there has always been a fundamental tension in the methodology of international
criminal law, one that has significantly undermined the field's legitimacy." Id.
89 The most persuasive account is Jenny S. Martinez, Towards an Interna-
tional Judicial System, STANFORD L. REV. 429, 466-67 (2003). See also William W.
Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of International Criminal
Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 93-94 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103, 1104 (2000); Wald, supa note 87, at
27 ("The Tribunals have looked to each other's work and the new ICC has adopted





This Part begins by laying out the functional differences
across tribunals, to show how the different aiding and abetting
standards fit the functional roles of the different tribunals. It
then examines the relationship between customary interna-
tional law and pluralism. It concludes by showing how under-
standing the pluralistic nature of international criminal law
can help resolve the confusion that has plagued U.S. courts in
cases brought under the Alien Tort Statute.
A. Functional Differences Across Tribunals
The differences in aiding and abetting standards across
international and hybrid tribunals are often a reflection of the
different functional roles of the tribunals. The ad hoc tribunals
and hybrid tribunals were created in response to historically
unprecedented atrocities in the countries concerned. In the ad
hoc tribunals, faced with the immediacy of serious crimes in
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and with the sanction of the UN Se-
curity Council Resolutions, state sovereignty was not an obsta-
cle to the prosecution of international crimes.9 0 The hybrid
tribunals, on the other hand, were each set up with unique
combinations of international and domestic criminal law, de-
pending on the atrocities being redressed. Finally, the ICC was
created to be a court of last resort when all other options for
prosecuting the most serious crimes had failed. Concerned
that their own citizens could be brought before the ICC, states
made the ICC complementary with national jurisdictions and
placed restrictions on the authority of the prosecutor.9 1 The
ICC, it was decided, would try only those cases which had
"sufficient gravity."9 2 It is not surprising, then, that the draft-
ers of the Rome Statute adopted a higher mens rea standard
than other international tribunals.9 3
The sui generis "purpose" standard for mens rea in the
Rome Statute is largely the result of negotiating compromises.
90 CASSESE, supra note 22, at 455 ("The conflicts which erupted in, amongst
other places the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the atrocities they engen-
dered served to rekindle the sense of outrage felt at the closing stage of the Second
World War. By way of response, the UN Security Council, pursuant to its power to
decide on measures necessary to maintain or restore international peace and
security under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, set up two ad hoc tribunals: in
1993, by resolution 827 (1993), the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), and in 1994, by resolution 955 (1994), the International Crimi-
nal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).").
91 Rome Statute art. 1, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
92 Rome Statute art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
93 Telephone Interview with David J. Scheffer, Former U.S. Ambassador-at-
Large for War Crimes Issues (Oct. 12, 2017).
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But other differences in the aiding and abetting standard
across the ad hoc tribunals, hybrid tribunals, and the ICC are
likely the result of functional differences between these tribu-
nals, including the decision to adopt a heightened standard
altogether. Indeed, some commentators have suggested that
jurists at the ICC should not even look to the ICTY and ICTR for
jurisprudential guidance because of fundamental differences
in the respective courts' functions.9 4 This section considers
the purpose of each set of international criminal tribunals-the
ad hoc tribunals, hybrid tribunals, and the ICC-and explores
how differences in the tribunals' aiding and abetting standards
can be explained at least in part by these functional
differences.
1. Ad Hoc Tribunals
The ICTY Statute was adopted by the United Nations Se-
curity Council to provide criminal jurisdiction over horrific
abuses that occurred in the former Yugoslavia in the early
1990s.95 The Security Council requested a report from the
Secretary General on ways to establish a criminal tribunal and
ensure accountability.9 6 Within 100 days, the Security Council
adopted the Secretary General's draft report without a single
change.9 7 Because the tribunal was established pursuant to a
Chapter VII Resolution under the UN Charter, the consent of
affected state parties was not required.98 Security Council Res-
olution 827, which established the ICTY in May 1993, marked
the creation of the first tribunal under Chapter VII.99 Notably,
94 See, e.g., Volker Nerlich, The Status of ICTY and ICTR Precedent in Proceed-
ings Before the ICC, in THE EMERGING PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
325 (Carsten Stahn & Gbran Sluiter eds., 2009) ("[Olne must warn against inge-
nious reliance on the case law of the ICTY and ICTR"); Anthony J. Sebok, Taking
Tort Law Seriously in the Allen Tort Statute, 33 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 871, 883 (2008)
("While most agree on the standards generally applied by tribunals in Rwanda and
the former Yugoslavia, a number of scholars and judges have questioned whether
these courts should be relied upon as a meaningful source of international law.").
95 See 20 Years of International Justice, INT'L CRIM. TRIB. FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/content/20-years-international-justice
[https://perma.cc/4HYN-2YSH] (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
96 Larry D. Johnson, Ten Years Later: Reflections on the Draftng, 2 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 368, 369 (2004).
97 Id. at 376.
98 See Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICT in the Development of Interna-
tional Criminal Adjudication, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 440, 444 (1999) ("While the
Croatian Government and the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina
called for and supported the establishment of the Tribunal, the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia and Bosnian Serbs opposed it.").
99 Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
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because the Security Council lacked power to "legislate" new
international law, the Secretariat could only include in its draft
those provisions that were "beyond any doubt part of custom-
ary international law." 100 The drafters "explicitly declined to
make it a self-contained criminal code." 0 1 As one legal officer
involved in the drafting process recounted: "[1It was thought
prudent, in spite of temptation, not to use the occasion to advo-
cate 'progressive' interpretations, clarifications or additions,
but rather to stick as much as possible to what was incontro-
vertibly customary international law."l0 2 Any further elabora-
tion of the elements of crimes under its statute would be left to
judicial discretion.103 As a result, the tribunal did not have a
statutory aiding and abetting standard. Rather, the court was
left to establish the standard through its jurisprudence.
0 4
The ICTR was the next tribunal created under the aegis of
the UN Charter's Chapter VII, pursuant to Resolution 955
adopted in November 1994.105 The ICTR Statute differed
slightly from the ICTY Statute. According to the Secretary-
General's account, the Security Council
elected to take a more expansive approach to the choice of
applicable law than the one underlying the Statute of the
Yugoslav Tribunal, and included ... international instru-
ments regardless of whether they were considered part of
customary international law or whether they customarily en-
tailed the individual criminal responsibility of the perpetrator
of the crime.106
Still, as with the ICTY, the statute of the ICTR offered minimal
guidance as to aiding and abetting liability.
Both ad hoc tribunals were established to provide account-
ability for a specific set of events. In both cases, the tribunals
could step in and take over judicial proceedings from the do-
100 Johnson, supra note 96, at 370.
101 Fausto Pocar, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/icty/icty-e.pdf {https://penna.cc/
25R7-QA7M] (last visited Nov. 30, 2017).
102 Johnson, supra note 96, at 370.
103 See Pocar, supra note 101.
104 "In interpreting aiding and abetting in international law, the Trial Cham-
bers in Tadi6 and Furundzya relied upon case law produced by the post-Nurem-
berg war crimes trials." SLIEDREGT, supra note 61, at 121 (citing Prosecutor v.
Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Trial Judgment, 191 675-86 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997); Prosecutor v. Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-
T, Trial Judgment, 191 190-249 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec.
10, 1998)).
105 Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, Annex
(Nov. 8, 1994).
106 Johnson, supra note 96, at 370 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 104:15931622
AIDING AND ABETTING
mestic courts. While the ICTY and ICTR technically wield con-
current jurisdiction with national jurisdictions, their
prosecutors have the authority to issue orders for deferral to
the competence of the respective tribunal.10 7 As one scholar
explained: "The purpose of primacy [was] to ensure that mini-
mum standards of impartial adjudication [would] be met in
cases of great international concern."10 8
The structures of both ad hoc tribunals emphasize the role
of dynamic judicial interpretation. For example, the tribunals'
expansive powers to amend the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence as needed demonstrate a unique degree of judicial au-
thority.10 9 This flexibility is "something that sets [the ad hoc
tribunals] aside from other criminal jurisdictions, including the
ICC."110 As former Senior Legal Officer at the IC'lY Gideon
Boas explained, one justification for this dynamism and flexi-
bility in the development of the rules is that "the judges of the
court are often in the best position to understand the needs of
the institution whilst considering the balancing of the various
issues in play.""I1 This discretion was necessary because the
international tribunals were considered the only viable forum
to hold the perpetrators of international crimes accountable.
The judges of the ICTY and ICTR could reasonably assume that
those individuals they did not find accountable might very well
escape accountability altogether.
2. Hybrid Tribunals
Hybrid tribunals are criminal courts with features of both
international and domestic jurisdictions. For example, the UN
set up the Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2002 pursuant to a
request by the government of Sierra Leone for "a special court"
to address the serious crimes committed during the country's
107 Rep. of the S.C., ¶1 89, U.N. Doc. A/49/342, S/1994/1007 (1994).
108 Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurtsdic-
tion of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT'L L.
383, 387 (1998).
109 See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 6, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev.
49 (2013) (as amended); ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 6, U.N. Doc.
ITR/3/Rev. 1 (2000) (as amended).
110 Gideon Boas, Comparing the ICTY and the ICC: Some Procedural and Sub-
stantive Issues, 2000 NETH. INT'L L. REv. 267, 268.
111 Id. at 275. Boas continued: "The dynamism and flexibility of the develop-
ment of the Rules of the ICTY reflects a healthy process of concern for the rights of
the accused and a desire to expedite proceedings before the International Tribu-
nal." Id. at 276.
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civil war.112 Negotiations between the United Nations and Si-
erra Leone on the structure and mandate of the court resulted
in the world's first "hybrid" criminal tribunal. 
1 1 3 Soon thereaf-
ter, several other tribunals followed suit. In 2003, the UN Gen-
eral Assembly signed an agreement with Cambodia to establish
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, a hy-
brid tribunal to try leaders of the Khmer Rouge." 4 Following
the February 2005 attack in Beirut that killed the former Leba-
nese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and twenty-two others, Leba-
non asked the UN to establish a hybrid tribunal.11
5 The
Statute of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon entered into force
in June 2007.
Each hybrid tribunal drew on different bodies of law in
developing their applicable law, and that in turn shaped the
contours of their respective aiding and abetting standards. In
particular, the precise combination of international and do-
mestic legal components varied across the tribunals. For this
reason, the hybrid tribunals should be approached with cau-
tion by those seeking to discover customary international crim-
inal law.
The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia,
for example, was based on Cambodian law-which was in turn
based on French law-and invoked international law only to fill
in the gaps. In spite of the international characteristics of the
Extraordinary Chambers, it drew upon evidentiary standards
that were consistent with Cambodian domestic law.1
16 As a
procedural matter, the international judges of the Extraordi-
nary Chambers were intended to constitute only a minority of
the judges.117 This may explain the fluctuation in the relevant
case law from an aiding and abetting standard that reflects the
international norm to a standard that aligns with Cambodian
domestic criminal law.
112 SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE, http://www.rscsl.org/ [https://
perma.cc/2YXA-56Y4] (last visited Nov. 29, 2017) (Center Column under "The
Special Court for Sierra Leone: Its History and Jurisprudence").
113 Id.
114 About ECCC, EXTRAORDINARY CHAMBERS IN THE COURTS OF CAMBODIA, https://
www.eccc.gov.kh/en/about-eccc [https://perma.cc/H7TQ-GJRHI (last visited
Feb. 28, 2019).
115 Factsheet: The Special Tribunal for Lebanon, UN NEWS, http://
www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Lebanon/ST-Fact-sheetEng.pdf fhttps://
perma.cc/R57T-VVW81.
116 See Prosecutor v. Kaing, Case No. 001/18-07-2007/ECCC/TC, Trial Judg-
ment, T 35 (July 26, 2010).
117 Cesare P.R. Romano, Mixed Criminal Tribunals, in 7 THE MAX PLANCK ENCY-




By contrast, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon does not
apply any substantive international criminal law. In its semi-
nal Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable Law: Terrorism,
Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, the
Tribunal's Appeals Chamber clarified that, pursuant to its stat-
ute, a conflict between Lebanese and international criminal law
is to be resolved by applying "the law that would lead to a result
most favorable to the rights of the accused."'18 When the Tri-
bunal discovered a conflict between the aiding and abetting
standards of the Lebanese Criminal Code and international
criminal law, it applied the Lebanese standard because it was,
on the whole, more stringent and, as a result, more protective
of the rights of the accused.1 19 The Special Tribunal for Leba-
non thus applies the standards enumerated in Article 219 of
the Lebanese Criminal Code.1 2 0
The Special Court for Sierra Leone prosecutes crimes
under both international and domestic law.121 The Court,
which comprises a majority of international judges, draws
heavily on international jurisprudence in defining its aiding
and abetting standard.
3. International Criminal Court
As a "court of last resort," the ICC is only authorized to
exercise its mandate over "the gravest crimes of concern to the
international community."I22 Under the principle of comple-
mentarity, the Court lacks primary jurisdiction to adjudicate
crimes. If member states are genuinely able and willing to
perform their own investigations and prosecutions, the Court
118 Prosecutor v. Ayyash, Case No. STL-11-01/I, 91 211 (Feb. 16, 2011).
119 Id. T9 211, 264.
120 Lebanese Criminal Code, art. 219, as amended by art. 11 of Legislative
Decree No. 112 of Sept. 16, 1983 ("1. Anyone who issues instructions for its
commission, even if such instructions did not facilitate the act; 2. Anyone who
hardens the perpetrator's resolve by any means; 3. Anyone who, for material or
moral gain, accepts the perpetrator's proposal to commit the offence; 4. Anyone
who aids or abets the perpetrator in acts that are preparatory to the offence; 5.
Anyone who, having so agreed with the perpetrator or an accomplice before com-
mission of the offence, helped to eliminate the traces, to conceal or dispose of
items resulting therefrom, or to shield one or more of the participants from jus-
tice; 6. Anyone who, having knowledge of the criminal conduct of offenders re-
sponsible for highway robbery or acts of violence against state security, public
safety, persons or property, provides them with food, shelter, a refuge or a meeting
place.")
121 Romano, supra note 117, '9 49-51.
122 About, INT'L CRIM. CouRT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/about [https://
perma.cc/8WSM-C74Z] (last visited Nov. 29, 2017).
2019]1 1625
may not intervene.12 3 Because the ICC wields complementary
jurisdiction and only addresses the most serious crimes, it
makes sense that the requisite elements of liability are more
stringent-and hence narrower-than those of the ad hoc and
hybrid tribunals that exercise primary jurisdiction.
During the 1994 negotiations of the Draft Statute for an
International Criminal Court by the International Law Com-
mission, some "cautioned against placing too much emphasis
on [the Statute and Rules of the ICTY] in light of the essential
differences between the two institutions."1 24 Adriaan Boss, for-
mer Chairman of the Preparatory Committee on the Establish-
ment of the ICC, wrote, "in the Ad Hoc Committee a clear
preference was expressed to confine the jurisdiction ratione
materiae to a limited number of core crimes."l
25 He explained
at the time that "[tihe idea of the Court is inspired by the desire
to prevent serious crimes from going unpunished, be it by the
national judiciary or by the Court."1 26 Modern commentators
have also noted that ICC judges should not look to the ad hoc
tribunals for guidance because of their functional
differences. 127
Due to its stringent mens rea standard for aiding and abet-
ting, even with a weaker actus reus requirement, the ICC stan-
dard as a whole is not weak. Indeed, one might even argue that
the ad hoc tribunals' actus reus requirement (assistance with a
substantial effect) was merely transplanted in the Rome Stat-
ute's mens rea requirement, in the form of the "purpose" stan-
dard, which is stricter than the knowledge standard of the ad
hoc and hybrid tribunals. This stringent mens rea standard
functions as an implicit causation requirement.
12 8 In the 2016
123 See Rome Statute arts. 1, 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
124 Adriaan Bos, The Experience of the Preparatory Committee, in THE ROME
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNTY 23 (Mauro
Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001); see also Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. of the Int'l Law
Comm'n on the Work of its Forty-Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), re-
printed in [1994] 2(2) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 1, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/
Add. 1 ("[Other members cautioned against placing too much emphasis on those
instruments in the light of the essential differences between the two
institutions.").
125 Bos, supra note 124, at 24.
126 Id. at 26.
127 See, e.g., Nerlich, supra note 94, at 325 ("[O]ne must warn against inge-
nious reliance on the case law of the ICTY and ICTR."); Sebok, supra note 94, at
883 ("While most agree on the standards generally applied by tribunals in Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia, a number of scholars and Judgeshave questioned
whether these courts should be relied upon as a meaningful source of interna-
tional law.").
128 Elies van Sliedregt agrees that the causation requirement for aiding and
abetting "is typically an element that is developed in case law." VAN SLIEDREGT,
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Bemba and Al Mal-di cases, for example, the ICC read a causal
component into Article 25(3)(c), requiring that the accessorial
act must materially assist the commission of the crime.1 2 9 In
Bemba, the Trial Chamber VII clarified: "The Chamber holds
that even though the contribution of the accessory need not be
conditio sine qua non to the commission of the principal of-
fence, the assistance must have furthered, advanced or facili-
tated the commission of such offence."130 The heightened
"purpose" standard of the ICC Statute effectively makes up for
the more lax actus reus requirement. 13
This section argued that functional pluralism is a funda-
mental reason for fragmentation. Each criminal tribunal was
founded for distinct purposes, which have influenced their aid-
ing and abetting standards. The remainder of this Article will
consider the consequences of this explanation for future inter-
pretations of aiding and abetting liability at the ICC, across
customary international law, and in U.S. domestic courts.
B. Custom and Functional Pluralism
It is not uncommon for scholars to declare that custom is
waning in importance as a source of international criminal
supra note 61, at 128; see also FINNIN, supra note 62, at 123-24 ("[Mjost commen-
tators agree that such a requirement is implicit in the Statute"); GERHARD WERLE,
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 144-45 (2d ed. 2009) (explaining that a
causation requirement "implicitly . .. arises out of Article 30 of the ICC Statute").
129 Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Decision on the Con-
firmation of Charges, T 26 (Mar. 24, 2016) ("[I]n essence, what is required for this
form of responsibility is that the person provides assistance to the commission of
a crime and that, in engaging in this conduct, he or she intends to facilitate the
commission of the crime. It is not required that the assistance be substantial or
anyhow qualified other than by the required specific intent to facilitate the com-
mission of the crime (as opposed to a requirement of sharing the intent of the
perpetrators)." (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
130 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, Trial Judgment Pursu-
ant to Article 74 of the Statute, q1 94 (Oct. 19, 2016).
131 Similarly, several scholars and judges have asserted that the specific direc-
tion element should be assessed in the context of a mens rea analysis instead.
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. PeriWid, Case No. IT-04-81-A, Appeal Judgment, q 4 (Feb.
28, 2013) (Theodor Meron and Carmel Agius, Joint Separate Opinion) ("[Were we
setting out the elements of aiding and abetting outside the context of the Tribu-
nal's past jurisprudence, we would consider categorising specific direction as an
element of mens rea."); Susanne J. Haugen, "Specific Direction" in Perid§i6 and
Taylor 35 (Nov. 25, 2014) (unpublished master thesis, University of Oslo) (on file
with author) ("If the requirement of 'specific direction' is to be accepted and ap-
plied as a necessary and essential element of the actus reus of aiding and abetting
liability, it has been argued that the requirement would be more appropriately
placed in the mens rea of aiding and abetting liability.").
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law. 132 The perceived decline of custom is both a cause and a
consequence of fragmentation. It is a cause of fragmentation
because tribunals sometimes disclaim responsibility for either
applying or helping to create custom, while referring selectively
to the jurisprudence of other tribunals as persuasive authority.
At the same time, the apparent decline in custom may be a
consequence of fragmentation. Describing the now-standard
understanding of customary international law, the ICJ held in
Gulf of Maine that "customary international law . .. comprises
a set of customary rules whose presence in the opiniojuris of
States can be tested by induction based on the analysis of a
sufficiently extensive and convincing practice and not by de-
duction from preconceived ideas."s3 3 Fragmentation compli-
cates the inductive exercise by making it harder to convincingly
establish the shared opiniojuris of States.
But it is a mistake-both as a methodological matter and
in light of customary international law's continued importance
in domestic and international courts-to assume that custom
and differences across tribunals are incompatible. A tribunal
may depart from the customary law standard for any number
of reasons. The fact that different standards apply across dif-
ferent tribunals is not necessarily evidence that custom has
failed to congeal.
There are many possible reasons that different legal stan-
dards emerge for international crimes. One is the vagaries of
negotiations. For example, the Rome Statute adopted its dis-
tinct mens rea standard of "purpose" in significant part be-
cause of disagreements during negotiations between states
with distinct criminal legal traditions. The Rome Statute was
the first international instrument to include a general provision
on the mental state element required for criminal culpability
under international criminal law.13 4 Introducing specific mens
132 See, e.g., Larissa van den Herik, The Decline of Customary International
Law as a Source of International Criminal Law, in CUSToM's FUTURE: INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN A CHANGING WORLD 230-31 (Curtis A. Bradley ed., 2016).
133 Delimination of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area (Can./U.S.),
Judgment, 1984 I.C.J. Rep. 246, 299, 91 111 (Oct. 12).
134 FINNIN, supra note 62, at 149 ("The Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters con-
tained no such provision, nor did Control Council Law No. 10. The Statutes of the
Tribunals did not contain such a provision, nor did the various Draft Codes
prepared by the ILC. This omission was not repeated with the Rome Statute,
which includes a specific provision (Article 30) on the mental element required for
crimes within the ICC's jurisdiction. This makes Article 30 the first of its kind.").
An early draft of the Rome Statute initially left out the mens rea element, in-
tending the Court to develop a standard through its jurisprudence. However, an
Ad Hoc Committee of the U.N. General Assembly found that the Rome Statute
should at least address the mental element in the final treaty on the basis of the
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rea language required a consensus among delegates from com-
pletely different legal backgrounds. This hodgepodge of back-
grounds was further complicated by the defensive interests of
each state; whereas a like-minded group of middle-income and
developing countries favored a strong, independent court, the
permanent members of the Security Council, inter alia, empha-
sized the importance of adequately circumscribing the eventual
court's powers.13 5 The latter group of states undoubtedly
sought to mitigate the potential liability of their own personnel
in future armed conflicts. 1 3 6 Still, no single member state dom-
inated the negotiations. Instead, the piecemeal appeasement
of disparate legal traditions resulted in a framework filled with
ambiguities that jurists have been left to reconcile. The negoti-
ating history of the Rome Statute suggests that the addition of
"purpose" was meant to represent a compromise between
knowledge- and intent-based standards.'3 7 But the term cho-
sen to convey this compromise standard-"purpose"-was
both novel to international criminal jurisprudence and not de-
fined in the Statute,38 leaving the project of defining the term
to the ICC judges.
Equally important-and less appreciated-is the explana-
tion that the different standards are the result of the distinct
functions of the different tribunals. Even the "purpose" stan-
dard in the Statute, which is a heightened mens rea standard,
principle of legality. The principle of legality is embodied by the Latin phrase
nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege, which means that there shall be no
crime nor punishment without expression in law. See Roger S. Clark, The Mental
Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the International Crimi-
nal Court and the Elements of Offences, 12 CRIM. L.F. 291. 296 (2001).
135 See Philippe Kirsch & John T. Holmes, The Rome Conference on an Interna-
tional Criminal Court: The Negotiating Process, 93 AM. J. INT'L LAw 2, 4 (1999).
136 See id.
137 Maria Kelt & Herman von Hebel, General Principles of Criminal Law and the
Elements of Crimes, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF CRIMES AND
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 12, 22 (Roy S. Lee ed., 2001) (arguing that
Article 30 "necessarily consisted of compromises between different concepts or
norms from various legal systems"); Helmut Satzger, German Criminal Law and
the Rome Statute: A Critical Analysis of the New German Code of Crimes Against
International Law, 2 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 261, 269 (2002) (describing Article 30 as
"quite clearly a compromise between continental and Anglo-American criminal
law, which leaves lawyers from both sides with difficulties"); see also Per Saland,
International Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 189, 198 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); David Scheffer &
Caroline Kaeb, The Five Levels of CSR Compliance: The Resiliency of Corporate
Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute and the Case for a Counterattack Strategy in
Compliance Theory, 29 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 334, 355 (2011) (describing "purpose"
as "an acceptable compromise phrase").




reflects the unique institutional characteristics and functions
of the ICC as a court of last resort. Understanding this second
reason for fragmentation in the aiding and abetting jurispru-
dence is key to charting a path forward. If the different stan-
dards are simply the product of bad coordination or negotiating
exigencies that produced poorly considered differences, then
the international community should seek greater uniformity.
If, however, the different standards serve different functional
purposes, then accommodating pluralism is essential to a well-
functioning international criminal law system.
C. Ending the Fruitless Search for Unity: Case of the Alien
Tort Statute
While this Article has focused primarily on the standard of
aiding and abetting liability under criminal law, many national
courts stipulate civil liability for the commission of interna-
tional crimes. The U.S. Alien Tort Statute (ATS), for example,
allows foreign citizens to file civil suits against the perpetrators
of certain violations of the law of nations.13 9 But U.S. courts-
confused by the case law described in this Article-have
adopted wildly different views of the appropriate aiding and
abetting standard for international criminal law. The Supreme
Court has acknowledged the existence of aiding and abetting
liability under the ATS-in a footnote in Sosa4 0-but it did not
describe the appropriate substantive standard. Subsequently,
the Courts of Appeal for the Second,14 1 Fifth, 1
4 2 Ninth,1 4 3 Elev-
enth,14 4 and D.C. 145 Circuits all held that the ATS encom-
passes aiding and abetting liability. These courts disagree
sharply on the precise contours of the aiding and abetting lia-
bility standard. They also disagree on the appropriate source
of the standard-whether the standard of aiding and abetting
139 See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2018).
140 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
141 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259
(2d Cir. 2009); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir.
2007); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539, 565
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
142 Carmichael v. United Tech. Corp., 835 F.2d 109, 113-14 (5th Cir. 1988).
143 Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 749 (9th Cir. 2011), vacated, 133 S.
Ct. 1995 (2013).
144 Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008); Cabello
Barrueto v. Fernandez Larios, 205 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002), affd,
402 F.3d 1148 (11th Cir. 2005).
145 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated, 527 F.
App'x 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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liability should come from federal common law or international
criminal law.
When U.S. courts look to the aiding and abetting liability
standard developed under international criminal law for gui-
dance, they are left to navigate the fragmented and sometimes
confused jurisprudence of the international tribunals. Incon-
sistent and uneven domestic jurisprudence has inevitably
arisen as a result. Some U.S. courts have relied on the juris-
prudence of the ad hoc and hybrid tribunals and adopted the
"specific direction"14 6 and "substantial effect"14 7 actus reus re-
quirements, as well as the "knowledge" mens rea standard.1 4 8
Others have relied instead on the ICC's jurisprudence, holding
that "purpose" is necessary to establish mens rea for aiding
and abetting liability under the ATS (rather than the more com-
mon "knowledge" standard).'4 9 Recognizing disagreement
among the international tribunals, some U.S. courts have at-
tempted to draw a line in the sand without offering clear expla-
nations for their choices.15 0 Other U.S. judges simply ignored
the fragmentation.15 1
The Second Circuit's ruling in Khulumani v. Barclay Na-
tional Bank, Ltd.1 5 2 illustrates the doctrinal confusion and dis-
agreement among U.S. judges. In Khulumani, three groups of
plaintiffs brought ten claims, including under the ATS, against
fifty major multinational banks and corporations that had op-
erated in South Africa during the apartheid. The court's per
146 Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1080 (C.D. Cal. 2010), rev'd and
vacated sub non. Doe I v. Nestle USA, Inc., 766 F.3d 1013 (9th Cir. 2014).
147 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Katzmann, J., concurring); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009); see also Shan v. China Constr. Bank
Corp., No. 09-8566, 2010 WL 2595095, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. June 28, 2010) (setting
out the actus reus requirement as necessitating "substantial effect").
148 Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 259 (adopting Judge
Katzmann's formulation); Khulumant, 504 F.3d at 277 (Katzmann, J., concur-
ring); see also Khulumant, 504 F.3d at 332-33 (Korman, J., concurring in relevant
part).
149 Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 259; Khulunant, 504 F.3d at
277 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
150 Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 ("To the extent that the International
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have occasionally
adopted a less stringent standard, see, e.g., Mrksic, at 'I 159; Furundzya, 38 I.L.M.
317 at 'A 249, the Court believes that the standard articulated in Blagojevic,
Ntagerura, Blaskic, and Vasilievic best reflects the relevant caselaw discussed
infra.").
151 See, e.g., Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1356 (N.D. Ga.
2002) (applying the ICTY's actus reus and mens rea requirements, as developed in
the ICTY Statute and elaborated in Furundzya)
152 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 254.
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curiam opinion failed to provide a common theory of aiding and
abetting liability. In fact, each of the three judges in Khulumani
filed separate opinions. In his concurrence, Judge Katzmann
concluded that aiding and abetting liability was permissible
under the ATS, and that the requisite mens rea element was
purpose, not knowledge, pursuant o the Rome Statute.1 5 3 In a
separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part,
Judge Korman endorsed Judge Katzmann's standard, but sug-
gested that Judge Katzmann failed to apply it properly.1 5 4
Judge Hall contended that the aiding and abetting liability
standard should not draw from international law at all; rather,
the standard should draw from domestic law-in particular,
the Restatement (Second) of Torts.1 5 5
Judge Katzmann's Khulumani concurrence demonstrates
the mistaken search for a single, unified standard for interna-
tional aiding and abetting liability. After considering the juris-
prudence of the Nuremberg Tribunals, the ad hoc tribunals,
and the ICC, Judge Katzmann ultimately adopted the ICC's
mens rea standard of "purpose." Judge Katzmann's dicta re-
garding the relationship between the ICC's and ad hoc tribu-
nals' standards seeks to reconcile the manifest differences
between their approaches in favor of a single standard. Judge
Katzmann writes: "[T]he Rome Statute's mens rea standard is
entirely consistent with the application of accomplice liability
under the sources of international law discussed."156 He clari-
fies: "My research has revealed no source of international law
that recognizes liability for aiding and abetting a violation of
international law but would not authorize the imposition of
such liability on a party who acts with the purpose of facilitat-
ing that violation."15 7 Though accurate, this statement is mis-
leading. Judge Katzmann assumes a single unitary standard
for aiding and abetting liability-"purpose"-exists under cus-
tomary international law because the mental state is sufficient
to establish liability in all jurisdictions. This assumption ne-
glects unique reasons the ICC adopted a more stringent mens
rea standard than any other international criminal tribunal.
153 Khulumant, 504 F.3d at 275-77 (Katzmann, J., concurring). It is worth
noting, however, that Judge Katzmann also adopted the ad hoc tribunals' "sub-
stantial effect" requirement due to the ICC's silence on the actus reus component.
Id. at 277.
154 See id. at 330-33.
155 Id. at 287-88 (Hall, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 276 (Katzmann, J., concurring).
157 Id at 276-77.
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Judge Katzmann acknowledged that "the opinions of the
ICTY and ICTR provide evidence of the state of customary inter-
national law."'15  However, he chose to forego the ad hoc tribu-
nals' standard because it was not "sufficiently well-established
and universally recognized to trigger jurisdiction for a tort suit
under the AT[S], particularly in light of the higher standard
articulated in the Rome Statute."5 9 Moreover, he asserted that
the "completely distinct factual contexts and . . . alternate theo-
ries of liability" create "limitations on the extent to which we
may rely on the decisions of the ICTY and ICTR."o60 By con-
trast, Judge Katzmann explained his decision to rely on the
Rome Statute as based in part on its broad adoption: "the
[Rome] Statute has been signed by 139 countries and ratified
by 105, including most of the mature democracies of the
world"' 6 ' and thus reflects "an authoritative expression of the
legal views of a great number of States."16 2
Judge Katzmann's reliance on the Rome Statute does not
account for the distinctive aim of the Rome Statute. For in-
stance, the drafters at Rome purposely chose "to retain . . .
narrow focus on criminal liability of natural persons only,"
leaving "civil damages for both natural and juridicial persons
out of the discussion and the court's jurisdiction."16 3 Professor
David Scheffer clarified in an amicus brief that the omission of
civil liability from the Rome Statute should not indicate a rejec-
tion of such liability in other contexts: 14 "There is a meaning-
ful difference between civil and criminal liability in the history
of the Rome Statute negotiations, in Alien Tort Statute prece-
dent, and in international law."'6 5 Unfortunately, Judge
Katzmann's approach to establishing the aiding and abetting
standard did not acknowledge that there could be good reasons
for maintaining distinct and divergent standards for aiding and
abetting liability in different contexts.
158 Id. at 278.
159 Id. at 279.
160 Id. at 278.
161 Id. at 276.
162 Id. (citing Prosecutor v. Furundiija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Trial Judg-
ment, ¶1 227 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslalvia May 7, 1997).
163 Brief for David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Kiobel
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108 (2013) (No. 10-1491), 2011 WL
6813576, at 8-9).
164 Id.
165 Id. at 7.
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Judge Katzmann is not alone; a large contingent of U.S.
judges have leaned on the ICC's interpretation.16 6 As Professor
Scheffer noted in his amicus brief in the South African
Apartheid cases, this trend unfortunately ignores that "more
authentic guidance is found in federal common law, which for
cases of this character is informed by customary international
law, that has been unquestionably shaped by the rich body of
jurisprudence delivered by the [ad hoc and hybrid tribunals],
particularly in recent years."'6 7
If judges were to recognize that there are differences in the
case law driven by the different tribunals' functional roles, they
would know that they ought not look to the Rome Statute as
evidence of customary international law. Rather, judges
should recognize that the Rome Statute does not embody cur-
rent customary international law simply because it is the last
statute written. The Rome Statute is better understood as
adopting a particular standard appropriate to its unique role as
an international court of last resort, thus representing a depar-
ture from custom rather than an evolution of custom.
III
How TO STRENGTHEN AND ENABLE FUNCTIONAL PLURALISM
That this Article recognizes the value of functional plural-
ism does not mean that it sees no room for improvement. Quite
the opposite: this Article recognizes that many of the differ-
ences in the standards used by courts to assess aiding and
abetting liability are driven by functional differences, but not
all are. The absence of clear, shared terminology means that
even when statute drafters or tribunals seek to craft a standard
for functional purposes, the failure to use terms that are well
understood can cause confusion and, in some cases, lead
courts to misinterpret the authors' intent. Indeed, the profu-
sion of aiding and abetting standards-and accompanying ju-
risdictional interpretations-has resulted in substantial
confusion over the appropriate definitions of the mens rea re-
166 See Ryan S. Lincoln, To Proceed with Caution?: Aiding and Abetting Liabil-
ity Under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 604, 612-14 (2010) (ex-
plaining the potential reasons for the inconsistent weight given by U.S. judges to
different sources of international law in ATS cases).
167 Brief for David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants,
Balintulo v. Ford Motor Co., 796 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-4104), 2015 WL
1140810, at *12-13 (citing Brief for David J. Scheffer as Amicus Curiae in Sup-
port of the Issuance of a Writ of Certiorari, Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.




quirements for aiding and abetting liability. In order to remedy
this confusion, this Article recommends the codification of
mens rea terminology to eliminate the friction of translating
standards across jurisdictions and to ensure courts appropri-
ately interpret aiding and abetting standards.16 8
Classic approaches to mens rea have traditionally taken
two forms: the "elements" approach, which breaks down a
crime into its constituent parts (conduct, results, and circum-
stances), and the "offense" approach, which generally assigns a
single mens rea state to the entire crime.16 9 Criminal law
scholars have largely rejected the "offense" approach. The
drafters of the Rome Statute followed suit, defining the mens
rea state for every element of a crime.17 0
The drafters of the Rome Statute apparently modeled Arti-
cle 30's mens rea terminology on the definitions used by the
U.S. Model Penal Code.171 Table 2 below illustrates this point
by contrasting the definitions of mens rea states provided in
the Rome Statute with corresponding definitions in the Ameri-
can Law Institute's Model Penal Code.
168 Codification may have "a declarative effect on existing customary rules, a
crystallizing effect for customary rules still lacking in practice, or the generative
effect of a new customary rule by virtue of the new direction taken by State
practice as a consequence." ORIOL CASANOVAS, UNITY AND PLURALISM IN PUBLIC INTER-
NATIONAL LAw 38 (2001) (emphases in original).
169 Ted Sampsell-Jones, Mens Rea in Minnesota nd the Model Penal Code, 39
WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1457, 1461 (2013).
170 See Rome Statute art. 30(2)(b), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
171 FINNiN, supra note 62, at 201; see also id. at 161, n.56 ("This follows the
approach of the US Model Code, which recognizes 'conduct,' 'result[s] of conduct'
and 'attendant circumstances' as the possible elements of a crime: see Model
Penal Code § 2.02."); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(2) (AM. LAw INST. 1985).
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TABLE 2: MATERiAL ELEMENTS AND MENS REA STANDARDS UNDER
THE ICC AND U.S. MODEL PENAL CODE
Element Mens Rea ICC MPC
Standard
Conduct Intent "[The] person "[1It is his
means to conscious object
engage in the to engage in
conduct .... " conduct of that
nature . . .. "
Consequence Intent "[The] person "[It is his
means to cause conscious object
that . . . to cause
consequence or such a result





Knowledge "[Aiwareness "[H]e is aware
that .. . a that it is
consequence practically
will occur In the certain that his
ordinary course conduct will
of events." cause such a
result."
Circumstance Knowledge "[Aiwareness "[H]e is aware
that a . . . that such
circumstance circumstances
exists. ... " exist .... "
However, the definitional approaches of the MPC and ICC
diverge in a critical respect: the Rome Statute's definition of
"intent" in Article 30(2)(b) is overinclusive with regard to the
consequence element of the crime. The mens rea structure of
the Model Penal Code presents a tiered structure, where the
more stringent standards of mens rea satisfy the lesser stan-
dards. For example, if the accused has intent to commit a
crime, then she also satisfies the lesser mens rea standards of
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. Article 30(2)(b) of the
Rome Statute essentially inverts this structure. Because intent
exists whenever a "person means to cause that consequence or
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is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events,"172
any person that satisfies the knowledge standard under Article
30's definition will also satisfy the intent standard. And any
person who satisfies the intent standard will also satisfy the
knowledge standard. The Rome Statute's use of the disjunctive
connector ("or") undermines any meaningful distinction be-
tween these two mental elements. In contrast, under the U.S.
Model Penal Code, intent satisfies knowledge, but not the other
way around.








The imprecision in the drafting of the Rome Statute con-
tributes to the confusion over the correct interpretation of the
mens rea standard for aiding and abetting. In Bemba, the ICC
said that the "purpose" threshold was equivalent to "intent" as
articulated in Article 30.173 However, it remains unclear
whether the ICC intended to distinguish this standard from
"knowledge" altogether.174 Here, the overlap in the Rome Stat-
ute's definitions of "intent" and "knowledge" introduces confu-
sion. Based on the statutory text of Article 30(2)(b), the term
"intent" incorporates the "knowledge" threshold. Conse-
quently, the term "purpose" could conceivably be interpreted
consistent with the "knowledge" threshold as well. No case
172 Rome Statute art. 30(2)(b), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (emphasis
added). The real issue with the definition here is that It seems like the ICC
includes the definition of knowledge within the definition of intent. Finnin sug-
gests that "both intent and knowledge" must be proven for every crime, but not for
every material element of the crime. See FIMNNiN, supra note 62, at 162.
173 Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/13, Trial Judgment Pursu-
ant to Article 74 of the Statute, 91 97 (Oct. 19, 2016).
174 Id. 91l92 ("Pre-Trial Chamber II in the Confirmation Decision stipulated that
the 'accessory's contribution has an effect on the commission of the offence and is
made with the purpose of facilitating such commission.' Equally, Pre-Trial Cham-
ber I in BL6 Goud66 stated that 'the person provides assistance to the commission of
a crime and that, in engaging in this conduct, he or she intends to facilitate the
commission of the crime.'" (emphasis added and footnote omitted)).
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before the court has yet clarified whether the term "purpose" is
distinct from "knowledge."175 Nor has any case addressed the
overlap between "intent" and "knowledge" in the Rome Statute.
Defining mens rea terminology is essential to the operation
of criminal law in general, and international criminal law spe-
cifically. However, the attempt made by the drafters of the
Rome Statute fell short. Its provisions were inconsistent with
accepted tenants of criminal law and have opened the door to
persistent confusion about the appropriate scope of both of its
defined terms-"intent" and "knowledge."
The goal of the drafters of the Rome Statute was the right
one. Establishing consistent and uniform definitions of mens
rea terminology is essential to the healthy functioning of inter-
national criminal law. But while the efforts undertaken in the
Rome Statute were laudable, they were incomplete (the Rome
Statute does not define important mens rea terms like reckless-
ness or negligence because they were beyond the scope of the
statute), defective (confusion over the appropriate definition of
intent), and narrow (only applicable to the ICC).
This Article argues for two solutions. First, mens rea ter-
minology should be codified to inform future developments in
international criminal law. Second, the ICC must provide addi-
tional clarification of the scope of "purpose" adopted in Article
25(3)(c) and address the ambiguity in the Rome Statute's defi-
nition of "intent" in Article 30.
A similar move toward codification of mens rea terminology
helped the United States domestic legal system achieve more
interpretational consistency across jurisdictions. Scholars
have recognized the codification of mens rea terms as the "most
significant innovation" of the Model Penal Code, which was
developed by the American Law Institute.'7 6 Prior to the devel-
opment of the Model Penal Code, "the common law of mens rea
was fundamentally incoherent and had been a constant source
of confusion for courts."' 7 7 Though the Model Penal Code has
not been adopted wholesale in any U.S. jurisdiction, the codifi-
cation of mens rea terms has brought substantial clarity to
U.S. criminal law.
Codification of mens rea terms could serve a similar role in
international criminal law. The International Law Commission
(ILC) is one possible international body that could be appropri-
ate to undertake this project. The United Nations established
175 Keitner, supra note 8, at 88.




the ILC in 1948 for the purpose of "encouraging the progressive
development of international law and its codification."178 The
ILC finds its origins in Article 13, paragraph 1 of the Charter of
the United Nations and was broadly supported by the govern-
ments involved in drafting the Charter. 1 7 9 Article 15 of the
Statute of the International Law Commission defines codifica-
tion as "the more precise formulation and systematization of
rules of international law in fields where there already has been
extensive State practice precedent and doctrine" and progres-
sive development as "the preparation of draft conventions on
subjects which have not yet been regulated by international
law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently
developed in the practice of States."o8 0 The Commission is
practiced in the field of international criminal law, having for-
mulated the Nuremberg principles, as well as prepared the
draft statute for the International Criminal Court and the draft
Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind.18 1
In selecting future substantive topics of law to explore, the
Commission measures the topic against the following criteria:
(i) the topic should reflect the needs of States in respect of the
progressive development and codification of international
law; (ii) the topic should be at a sufficiently advanced stage in
terms of State practice to permit progressive development
and codification; (iii) the topic should be concrete and feasi-
ble for progressive development and codification; and (iv) the
Commission should not restrict itself to traditional topics,
but should also consider those that reflect new developments
in international law and pressing concerns of the interna-
tional community as a whole. 182
Addressing the mental element of international criminal law
satisfies these criteria and would constitute an appropriate
project for the International Law Commission.
The codification of mens rea standards would have several
benefits. It would assist judges siting on international criminal
tribunals and encourage greater fidelity to the underlying tri-
bunal statute. It would also allow domestic courts to import
international criminal law into their own statutes, like the ATS,
with more clarity. Finally, the codification of mens rea terms
178 1 THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 5 (8th ed. 2012) [hereinaf-
ter WORK OF THE ILCI (quoting UN Charter art. 13, 91 1(a)).
179 Id. at 4.
180 Statute of the International Law Conunission art. 15, Nov. 21, 1947, G.A.
Res. 174 (II).
181 WORK OF THE ILC, supra note 178, at 8.
182 Id. at 45.
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would enable future international criminal tribunals to adopt
mens rea terms for their various criminal law standards with a
greater degree of confidence. Flexibility in the adoption of
mens rea standards can be a useful tool to regulate divergent
crimes and unique jurisdictional requirements across interna-
tional courts. However, it is necessary to clarify the appropri-
ate scope of these respective mens rea terms in order to retain
interpretational rigor and consistency.
Codification of mens rea terms would remove confusion
without forcing uniformity. It would give courts (and drafters of
any future statutes) a set of shared terms on which they could
draw. They would still have an array of different standards
available to them, but those different standards would have
clear meanings-so when one was used, its purpose would be
clear to all involved. In this way, codification could enhance
and rationalize the functional pluralism in the international
law of aiding and abetting and in international criminal law
more generally.
CONCLUSION
Aiding and abetting liability is of central importance to any
effective criminal justice system. It enables courts to hold ac-
countable individuals who were not direct perpetrators of the
crime, but who nevertheless assisted the principal perpetrator
in its commission. Within the international context, aiding and
abetting liability is particularly significant because interna-
tional violations-such as major human rights abuses, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity-are frequently perpe-
trated with the assistance of third-party accomplices. The
crimes committed in Nazi Germany are poignant reminders of
this fact. The Nuremberg Tribunal prosecuted the heads of
several German corporations-including those found to have
supplied poison gasses ultimately used in concentration
camps-under theories of accomplice liability.183 In recent
years, corporations that have aided and assisted states in com-
mitting genocide, crimes against humanity, and torture have
been subject to suit for their role enabling those crimes. How-
ever, confusion over the elements of aiding and abetting liabil-
ity have perplexed courts and perhaps contributed to the
183 See 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, 954-1201 (1951), The ZykIon B. Case, Trial of
Bruno Tesch and Two Others, British Military Court, Hamburg, 1st-8th March,
1946 in 1 LAw REPORTS OF TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 93 (1947).
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failure to bring aiders and abettors of international crimes to
justice.
This Article surveyed the fragmented legal standards for
aiding and abetting-and their consequences-across interna-
tional, hybrid, and domestic courts. Even within the various
international and hybrid criminal tribunals, the precise con-
tours of the aiding and abetting standard remain unclear. The
actus reus and mens rea requirements for aiding and abetting
have shifted not only across tribunals, but also within the ju-
risprudence of the various tribunals. At the ICC, imprecision
in the drafting of the Rome Statute has led to substantial con-
fusion over the appropriate mens rea state required to estab-
lish aiding and abetting complicity. The lack of a unitary
standard has also contributed to confusion in U.S. domestic
courts, where some judges have mistakenly searched for an
elusive unitary aiding and abetting standard in international
criminal law.
The scope of aiding and abetting liability can have acute,
real-world consequences. A high threshold for liability may
underassign liability, whereas a low threshold may overassign
liability. Undercriminalization allows perpetrators of interna-
tional crimes to go unpunished, whereas overcriminalization
subjects individuals and other non-state actors to unjust pun-
ishment. The existing state of fragmentation has exacerbated
the likelihood that judges will implement a standard for liability
in either extreme.
This Article argues that what at first appears as irrational
fragmentation is, in many cases, functional differences be-
tween tribunals in their legal standards. The distinct roles of
different tribunals sometimes demand different standards for
complicity liability. This Article argues for understanding and
embracing this functional pluralism. It encourages courts and
lawyers to refrain from eliminating this pluralism in a mis-
guided search for unity, and to instead enable and encourage
functional pluralism through a project of codification. Doing so
could eliminate confusion, enable and encourage appropriate
functional differences, and thereby better serve international
justice.
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